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TEK BACAKLI HAVA KARGO GEL˙IR Y ¨ONET˙IM˙I ˙IC¸˙IN AC¸IK
D ¨ONG ¨U POL˙IT˙IKALARI
Birce Tezel
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danıs¸manları: Nilay Noyan Bu¨lbu¨l, J.B.G Frenk
Anahtar Kelimeler: hava kargo, gelir yo¨netimi, c¸okboyutlu kapasite, kapasite u¨stu¨
rezervasyon, yer ayırtma limitleri, teklif fiyatlari, rassal programlama.
¨Ozet
Kargo nakliyatı havayolları endu¨strisinde belirgin bir gelir kaynag˘ıdır. Bu sebeple,
kargo is¸inin kendine mahsus zorluklarını hesaba katan yer ayırtma politikaları gelis¸tirmek
kritik bir o¨neme sahiptir. Bu zorluklar arasında c¸og˘unlukla hacim ve ag˘ırlık olarak o¨lc¸u¨len
c¸ok boyutlu kapasite yapısı ve rezervasyon yapılırken siparis¸in kapasite gereksinimlerinin
genelde kesin olarak bilinememesi sıranalabilir. Yolcu gelir yo¨netiminde yo¨neylem aras¸tır-
ması methodlarının, kapasite u¨stu¨ satım yu¨zu¨nden o¨denen ceza maliyetleri ile kapasite altı
satım yu¨zu¨nden olus¸an fırsat maliyetleri arasındaki o¨du¨nles¸imi go¨z o¨nu¨ne alarak kısıtlı ka-
pasitenin etkin bir s¸ekilde kullanılmasında oldukc¸a faydalı oldug˘u go¨ru¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r. Bu tezde,
benzer methodlar c¸es¸itli kargo tiplerini tas¸ıyan tek bacaklı uc¸us¸ların kapasite kontrol prob-
lemi ic¸in gelis¸tirildi. Gelen rezervasyon taleplerini, yer ayırtma limitlerine veya teklif fi-
yatlarına bag˘lı olarak kabul eden veya reddeden ac¸ık do¨ngu¨ politikaları u¨zerinde c¸alıs¸ıldı.
Uygun yer ayırtma limitlerini ve teklif fiyatlarını hesaplayabilmek ic¸in, belirsiz hacim
ve ag˘ırlık gereksinimleri varlıg˘ında, kapasite u¨stu¨ satım maliyetlerini go¨z o¨nu¨nde bulun-
duran eniyileme modelleri gelis¸tirildi. ¨Onerilen modellerin yararlılıg˘ını deg˘erlendirmek
ic¸in kapsamlı bir sayısal c¸alıs¸ma yapıldı. Sayısal sonuc¸lar, politikalarımızın literatu¨rdeki
c¸es¸itli yo¨ntemlerle elde edilen go¨stergeler ile kıyaslandıklarında iyi bir performans sergile-
diklerini go¨sterdi.
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Abstract
Transporting cargo is a significant source of revenue in the airline industry. It is there-
fore of critical importance to develop booking policies that address the unique challenges
presented by the cargo business: the capacity is multi-dimensional, generally measured
in terms of volume and weight, and the exact capacity requirements of a shipment are
usually not known with certainty at the time of making booking decisions. Operations
research methods have proven highly useful in passenger revenue management to effec-
tively allocate a limited capacity while considering the trade-off between the penalty costs
for oversold capacity and the opportunity costs for having unused capacity at the depar-
ture time. In this thesis, we develop similar methods for the capacity control problem over
a single-leg flight with multiple cargo types. We study open loop policies that accept or
reject a booking request for a certain type of cargo shipment based on booking limits or
bid-prices. In order to compute suitable booking limits and bid-prices, we develop op-
timization models that incorporate off-loading costs under uncertain volume and weight
requirements. We conduct a comprehensive computational study to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our proposed models. Numerical results demonstrate that our policies perform
well compared to benchmarks established by various methods in the literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Transporting cargo, either on a dedicated cargo fleet or in the bays of passenger aircraft,
is a significant and rapidly growing source of revenue in the airline industry. The In-
ternational Air Transport Association (IATA) reports that system-wide global revenues
from cargo in 2010 amounted to $49 billion, versus $371 billion from passengers (IATA,
2009). Moreover, during the same period cargo traffic volume has increased by 7%, versus
a 4.5% increase in passenger traffic volume. Boeing’s 2012 Current Market Outlook fore-
casts that the air-cargo industry will continue to grow at an average annual rate of 5.2%
through 2031 (Boeing Company, 2012). Despite the obvious importance of the problem,
only a relatively limited number of research studies have been dedicated to cargo rev-
enue and capacity management, in sharp contrast to the extensive literature on passenger
bookings.
Airlines typically sell cargo capacity either through allotment contracts, reserved for
major customers, or on the spot market (also referred to as free sale), where there are no
guaranteed capacities. In this thesis we focus on managing the capacity available for free
sale. The main objective is to obtain booking policies that make accept/reject decisions
as booking requests arrive over a booking period. The fundamental choice is between
accepting a request for a relatively cheap shipment, and rejecting it to save capacity for a
potential later arrival that could yield higher revenue. In this context, the capacity is per-
ishable: unused (spoiled) capacity after the departure of a flight is worthless. Therefore,
it is common practice to allow more bookings than the available capacity can accommo-
date, in order to compensate for late cancelations, no-shows, and overestimated capacity
requirements of accepted shipments. The trade-off that underlies booking decisions is
then between the denied service costs for oversold capacity (also known as off-loading
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costs), and opportunity costs for spoiled capacity at the departure time. As discussed in
Kasilingam (1997), off-loading costs may include the costs of transporting excess cargo
by alternative means, the costs of additional handling and storage, and the cost of lost
goodwill.
The literature on the cargo revenue management highlights numerous essential differ-
ences between passenger and air-cargo services (see, e.g., Kasilingam, 1996):
• Capacity is not necessarily integer-valued, and it is multi-dimensional, generally
measured in terms of volume and weight. Sometimes an additional dimension is
also considered, namely, the number of container positions (see, e.g., Kasilingam,
1998). However, this third dimension is rarely mentioned in the literature, and,
according to Pak and Dekker (2004), has no significant impact in practice.
• The exact volume and weight requirements of a cargo shipment are usually not
known with certainty at the time of making booking decisions, and are observed
only immediately prior to departure.
• Unlike in a passenger case, where each booking request is for a single uniform
seat regardless of the fare class, different types of cargo have different capacity
requirements. In addition, cargo types are also distinguished by their contents (e.g.,
flowers, clothes, electronics, or food), which affects shipping rates.
• The available capacity may also be uncertain until loading at the departure time, due
to dependence on various factors including the capacity utilized by the allotment
contracts, and the capacity requirements of passenger bags if the cargo is carried on
a passenger aircraft.
These differences provide a significant incentive to develop booking policies that are spe-
cific to cargo capacity management, and address some of the unique challenges outlined
above. The two main classes of booking policies commonly used in the revenue man-
agement literature are those based on booking limits, and those based on bid-prices. A
booking limit is an upper bound on the number of requests than can be accepted for a
particular type of product. According to a booking limit based policy, requests are ac-
cepted as long as booking limits are not reached. On the other hand, a bid-price policy
specifies a threshold price that should be charged for a booking, and a booking request is
accepted only if its net revenue exceeds the this price. Threshold prices for a shipment
are usually set as the sum of the bid-prices of its expected capacity resource requirements,
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and the bid-prices themselves can be interpreted as the monetary opportunity costs asso-
ciated with the resources consumed. These monetary values depend on factors such as
the remaining capacity, the remaining time to departure, and expectations about future
demand.
When the booking limits or bid-prices are allowed to change over time in response to
such factors, they lead to dynamic booking policies that account for the behavior of the
system over time. It is obvious that dynamic policies have the potential to perform better
than their static counterparts. However, dynamic models are computationally challenging
due to potentially intractable multi-dimensional state spaces, and solving them typically
requires elaborate decomposition methods. For example, Levin et al. (2011) formulate the
booking control problem on the spot market as a dynamic program, and use a Lagrangian-
based decomposition strategy to approximate its value functions. We mention that there
exist other, comparatively easier decomposition-based methods that provide approximate
solutions for dynamic cargo booking control models, see, e.g., Amaruchkul et al. (2007).
As an alternative, we focus on open-loop, or static, models, which are generally more
tractable for practical use. Such methods can be used with a rolling time horizon ap-
proach, preserving the favorable computational properties of static models, while taking
into the dynamic behavior of the booking system.
In this thesis we limit our attention to cargo bookings over a single-leg flight. Some
airline companies, in particular charter airlines, only accept booking requests for single-
leg flights. However, larger airline companies typically transport cargo through a network
of locations connected by flights, and cargo booking requests specify an origin-destination
pair (in contrast to passenger booking requests, which typically specify an itinerary of
flights). The resulting network cargo capacity management problems are notoriously dif-
ficult, and solution methods often involve solving a series of single-leg subproblems. Sim-
ilarly to the passenger case (see, e.g. Topaloglu, 2009), this means that efficient solution
methods for single-leg problems are of high importance even in a network context.
The simplest booking limit policies (sometimes known as bucket allocations), par-
tition the available capacity according to fare classes. However, in practice partitioned
booking limits are rarely applied in a strict fashion. For instance, in a passenger con-
text it is clearly not beneficial to reject a higher fare class request when there is available
capacity for lower fare classes. Booking limits are therefore typically implemented in a
nested, or hierarchical, manner. Under a nested policy, higher fare classes are allowed to
use all the capacity reserved for lower fare classes. Since each accepted booking request
consumes a single unit of resource (namely, a uniform seat), the nested structure can be
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specified solely on the basis of the net revenues associated with each fare class. How-
ever, in the cargo case, each shipment consumes different amounts of multi-dimensional
capacity. Therefore, it is not trivial how to rank the cargo types when defining a nested
structure. In this thesis, we propose various methods to develop nested cargo booking
limits. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such attempt in the cargo revenue
management literature.
Our work on booking limits extends some of the passenger booking models proposed
in Aydin et al. (2010) to cargo bookings. We first consider a two-phase method, where
in the first phase we solve either a risk-based model or a service level-based model to
determine a total booking limit. The risk-based model aims to maximize expected prof-
its, while the service level-based one enforces a bound on the probability of overselling
capacity. In the second phase we use an allocation method based on expected marginal
seat revenue (EMSR) models to obtain nested booking limits. Our second-phase methods
provide several ways to rank cargo types according to profitability. We also present a
single-phase risk-based optimization model, which directly determines partitioned book-
ing limits. These partitioned limits are then used in a nested fashion, using our EMSR-
based ranking methods.
The booking limit approaches described above make the common assumption that
off-loading costs follow a specific structure, namely, that they can be written as the sum
of two convex functions, which represent the costs due to oversold volume and oversold
weight (see, e.g., Amaruchkul et al., 2007; Huang and Chang, 2010). While this cost
structure is more complex than overbooking costs in the passenger case (often assumed
either to be constant (Chatwin, 1999), or to depend only on the fare class), the assumption
that off-loading costs can be separated according to volume and weight is still somewhat
restrictive. In addition to our booking limit policies, we also present two bid-price-based
approaches, which do not rely on such assumptions. First, we adapt a traditional ran-
domized linear programming (RLP) model that defines bid-prices for units of volume and
weight capacity using the optimal dual variables associated with capacity constraints in
the RLP formulations. We then present a two-stage RLP model, where booking decisions
are made in the first stage, followed by off-loading decisions (which explicitly determine
the shipments that are to be denied loading) in the second stage. The cargo off-loading
problem we encounter in the second stage has previously been considered by Levin et al.
(2011), while a similar two-stage approach has been proposed in the passenger literature
by Kunnumkal et al. (2012).
We now briefly list the main contributions of this thesis.
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• We develop new optimization models to compute booking limits and bid-prices
for air-cargo capacity control on a single-leg flight. These models prove useful in
developing computationally tractable and practical policies.
• We propose various methods to rank different cargo types, and thus obtain nested
booking policies.
• We conduct a comprehensive computational study to evaluate the effectiveness of
our proposed models. In particular, we compare our policies with those provided
by various benchmark methods in the literature. Numerical results demonstrate that
our policies perform well in general compared to the benchmarks.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we review the literature
on cargo revenue management, with a particular emphasis on mathematical programming
based approaches. In Chapter 3 we describe the general problem setting, and present our
optimization models. Section 4 is dedicated to implementation details, numerical results
and managerial insights, while Section 5 contains our concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Revenue management (RM), also known as yield management, has been one of the most
successful application areas of operations research (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005; Phillips,
2005). The primary objective of RM is to maximize revenues by selling the right product
to the right customer at the right time for the right price1. Operations research meth-
ods have proven highly useful in airline passenger revenue management to effectively
allocate a limited capacity while considering the trade-off between the penalty costs for
oversold capacity and the opportunity costs for having unused capacity at the departure
time. However, there is a less extensive literature on cargo RM in contrast to the passenger
case. This can be partially attributed to the relatively higher complexity of cargo business
as discussed in Kasilingam (1996) and Becker and Dill (2007). Despite these challenges,
cargo RM has recently received increasingly more attention in the literature. Some of
the existing approaches from the rich passenger revenue management literature have been
and can be adapted to the cargo case. In this direction, it is essential to highlight the dif-
ferences between cargo and passenger transportation as in Kasilingam (1996). Billings
et al. (2003), Slager and Kapteijns (2004), and Becker and Dill (2007) also discuss the
unique features of cargo RM and review the related operations and implementations from
a practical point of view.
Many studies consider the cargo capacity management problem for a single-leg flight
and the most popular issues include the two-dimensional capacity and random volume
and weight requirements. Considering these issues Amaruchkul et al. (2007) formulate
the booking control problem as a Markov decision process (MDP). However, due to the
high dimensionality of this formulation, they cannot provide optimal policies. Instead,
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revenue management
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they propose various heuristics and an upper bounding approach. Their best performing
heuristic is based on the decoupling idea; decomposing the DP model over volume and
weight dimensions. There are many papers which base their research on the dynamic
model introduced by Amaruchkul et al. (2007). Huang and Chang (2010) tackle the same
problem and develop an approximate algorithm which jointly estimates the expected rev-
enue from weight and volume by sampling a limited number of points in the state space
instead of decoupling the problem and estimating the expected revenue in a sequential
manner as in Amaruchkul et al. (2007). Similarly, Zhuang et al. (2011) propose two
heuristics but for a single-resource (one-dimensional capacity) problem. Huang and Hsu
(2005) study uncertainty in supply; but they measure the capacity only in terms of weight
and they ignore the off-loading costs. Kasilingam (1997) also considers the uncertainty in
one-dimensional supply while trying to find the overbooking limit which minimizes the
total expected off-loading and spoilage costs. Xiao and Yang (2010) consider the two-
dimensional capacity, formulate the booking control problem as a continuous time MDP
but for only two types of demand and propose a threshold policy under some concavity
assumptions. Different than the above studies, Levin et al. (2011) present a model that
integrates multiple allotment contracts and spot market bookings of an airline for a set of
parallel flights. Unlike the existing studies, they also consider a off-loading problem to
compute the boundary condition of the DP optimality equations which accounts for the
total cost incurred at the departure time. As in Amaruchkul et al. (2007), they formulate
the booking control problem on the sport market as a dynamic program. However, they
construct approximations to its value functions using a Lagrangian approach to estimate
the total expected profit from the spot market. Using these approximations and a cutting
plane algorithm, they solve the allotment selection problem, which maximizes the sum of
the profit from the allotments and the estimated total expected profit from the spot market.
After this brief review of studies on dynamic models for the single-leg problem, we next
focus on the static approaches which are particularly related to this thesis.
Although static models are widely studied in the passenger case, there are a few static
models introduced for cargo RM. Among the heuristics proposed in Amaruchkul et al.
(2007), there are two static methods that solve deterministic linear programs based on the
expected values of the uncertain parameters. One is proposed to compute the bid-prices
and the other one is used to obtain the partitioned booking limits. To the best of our
knowledge, Amaruchkul et al. (2007) is the only study presenting a (partitioned) book-
ing limit policy. Even if there has been little work on bid-price policies for controlling
cargo booking, we can say that they are still the most common static policies. Therefore,
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we focus on the literature on bid-price policies. Han et al. (2010) model the air-cargo
booking process as a discrete-time Markov chain for a single-leg flight by discretizing
the volume and weight requirements and capacities. The expected revenue is written as
a function of the bid-prices and the optimal bid-prices are obtained using the Markovian
model. There are also bid-price policies for the network cargo capacity management. Pak
and Dekker (2004) model the booking process as a two-dimensional on-line knapsack
problem and use the greedy algorithm proposed in Rinnooy Kan et al. (1993) to solve the
knapsack problem and compute the bid-prices. As in Han et al. (2010), it is assumed that
no penalty is incurred when a booking request is rejected and the capacity requirements
are known with certainty when a booking request arrives. On the other hand, Karaes-
men (2001) introduces a LP based bid pricing model with a continuous attribute space
for a simplified cargo booking control problem, where attributes represent the capacity
requirements. Sandhu and Klabjan (2006) also present a mathematical programming for-
mulation that provides bid-prices for controlling origin-destination cargo bookings on a
network. However, they consider the fleet assignment model (FAM) which assigns a par-
ticular equipment type to each given flight-leg while maximizing profit. They develop a
FAM that incorporates both passenger and cargo revenue; the model is obtained by com-
bining the traditional leg-based FAM model with the passenger and cargo mix bid price
models. Recently, Popescu et al. (2012) have developed optimization models to compute
the bid-prices to control the booking over a network for a mixed demand pattern with
individual and batch requests. They decompose the demand into small and largo cargo
bookings. For the small and large cargo booking they use a probabilistic nonlinear pro-
gram from passenger literature and a DP model to compute the bid-prices, respectively.
However, the proposed model is based on itinerary-specific demand rather than the origin-
destination-specific demand.
Another type of static policy is based on overbooking limits; if accepting a booking
request for a cargo would bring the total volume and/or weight of the accepted cargoes
above the specified overbooking limits, that cargo would be rejected. The overbooking
strategy is meaningful in the existence of cancellations and no-shows. Luo et al. (2009)
and Moussawi and Cakanyildirim (2005) allow no-shows and study two-dimensional
cargo overbooking models to obtain a overbooking limit based policy. Moussawi and
Cakanyildirim (2005) develop two (aggregate and detailed) types of models to obtain
weight and volume overbooking limits maximizing the net profit. Their off-loading cost
does not depend on the individual cargoes; it is a linear function of the maximum of the
total off-loaded volume and weight. They express the showing up volume and weight in
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terms of the cargo density and provide equations to find an optimal overbooking curve
parameterized by the cargo density, which is proved to be a box. The modeling approach
used in Moussawi and Cakanyildirim (2005) is adapted from Luo et al. (2009). Differ-
ently, Luo et al. (2009) ignore the revenues and focus on minimizing the expected total
spoilage and off-loading costs, which are additive over volume and weight dimensions.
Air-cargo RM problems feature some similarities to passenger RM problems with
group (multiple seat) bookings. Van Slyke and Young (2000) study the finite-horizon
stochastic knapsack problem and consider a single-leg passenger RM problem with group
bookings as a special case of it. As emphasized in Amaruchkul et al. (2007), the algorithm
proposed in Van Slyke and Young (2000) may be computationally impractical for solving
large air-cargo booking control problems. Moreover, the capacity requirements and the
available capacities are assumed to be integer. Due to the random consumption of the ca-
pacity, air-cargo booking control problems are related to the stochastic multi-dimensional
knapsack problem. There are other studies on the dynamic stochastic knapsack problem
(see, e.g., Kleywegt and Papastavrou, 1998; 2001), but they in general propose models
that do not allow arrivals to have multi-dimensional capacity requirements.
Another stream of literature on cargo transportation is related to the network cargo
RM. It is a fairly recent research topic investigated among others by Karaesmen (2001);
Popescu (2006); Levina et al. (2011).
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Chapter 3
Stochastic Optimization Models
In this chapter, we first describe the general setting for our problem of interest: determin-
ing booking policies for cargo capacity management in the presence of uncertain capacity
requirements. We consider three types of modeling approaches and develop correspond-
ing optimization models.
• We first consider a two-phase approach: in the first phase we solve either a risk-
based or a service level-based model to determine a total booking limit. Then, in the
second phase we use an expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) based allocation
method to obtain nested booking limits. In order to implement such a method it is
necessary to rank different types of cargo in order to specify a nested structure. We
introduce and discuss several such ranking heuristics.
• We next consider an optimization model which directly obtains partitioned book-
ing limits for each cargo type, without the use of a predetermined total booking
limit. Similarly to the first approach, these partitioned limits can be used in a nested
fashion.
• The third modeling approach focuses on bid-price policies. We adapt two existing
methods from the literature on passenger revenue management, which use random-
ized linear programming (RLP) techniques.
3.1 Problem Setting
We consider the problem of controlling cargo bookings for a single-leg flight which trans-
ports multiple types of cargo between a particular origin-destination pair. Our goal is to
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find booking policies that make accept/reject decisions for each cargo shipment request.
In particular, we focus on open loop policies based on booking limits or bid-prices.
Booking requests typically specify the type of a cargo shipment, but not its exact vol-
ume and weight requirements. However, we assume that the joint distribution for the vol-
ume and weight of a shipment is available for each cargo type, and the exact volume and
weight are observed immediately before the departure time. Let us denote the available
volume and weight capacities of a flight by Cv and Cw, respectively. If these capacities
are not sufficient to accommodate all reserved cargo, some shipments are off-loaded to
be transported by alternative flights or other cargo carriers. In such situations the airline
incurs a penalty cost, similar to the overbooking penalty incurred for passengers that are
denied boarding. We note that in the literature off-loading is often considered in the con-
text of overbooking, i.e., when requests can be accepted in excess of available capacities
in order to compensate for potential cancelations and no-shows (Moussawi and Cakany-
ildirim, 2005; Luo et al., 2009). In contrast, in our models off-loading can occur even
under conservative booking policies, as a consequence of stochastic volume and weight
requirements.
To quantify off-loading costs we adopt a common approach (Amaruchkul et al., 2007;
Huang and Chang, 2010), and consider the sum of two convex functions hv and hw, which
represent the costs due to the oversold volume and weight, respectively. In the literature
the following choice of convex functions is commonly used:
hv(xv) = θv[xv − Cv]+, hw(xw) = θw[xw − Cw]+, (3.1)
where θv and θw are non-negative constants, and the variables xv and xw represent the
total volume and weight of accepted shipments, respectively. This approach implicitly
assumes that cargo shipments are divisible, and can be partially off-loaded; Moussawi
and Cakanyildirim (2005) provide a discussion on the conditions under which such an
assumption is justified. Recently, Levin et al. (2011) have proposed an alternate method
which explicitly solves an “off-loading problem” by identifying the individual shipments
that are to be denied loading. To implement this idea, we develop a two-stage stochastic
programming model which leads to an RLP formulation. While Kunnumkal et al. (2012)
consider a similar model to control passenger bookings, to the best of our knowledge no
analogous developments exist in the cargo literature.
We now introduce some additional notation used throughout the rest of the thesis. We
consider booking requests for a single-leg flight; each request concerns a single shipment
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which belongs to one of m cargo types. For i = 1, . . . , m we let (Vi,Wi) denote a random
vector whose two components have the same joint probability distribution as the volume
and weight of a shipment which belongs to type i. More precisely, we denote the volumes
and weights of individual type-i requests by (Vi1,Wi1), (Vi2,Wi2), . . . , and assume that
these vectors are mutually independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as (Vi,Wi). In
our models the distributions of (V1,W1), . . . , (Vm,Wm) are assumed to be given, with
respective expected values of (µv1, µw1 ), . . . , (µvm, µwm).
Remark 1 While cancelations lie outside the scope of this thesis, our modeling approach
can naturally incorporate no-shows by allowing the random vectors (Vi,Wi) to take value
(0, 0) with a positive probability.
The dimensional weight of a shipment with volume v is v/γ, where γ is a constant
(sometimes referred to as inverse density) defined by the IATA volumetric standard. The
revenue (or margin) obtained from accepting a type-i booking request with volume v and
weightw is given by ri(max(w, v/γ)), where ri : R → R is a revenue function associated
with the cargo type. The corresponding expected revenue is denoted by
ρi = E[ri(max(Wi, Vi/γ))], i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. (3.2)
We also use some standard mathematical notation and conventions. Random variables
are typically denoted by uppercase letters, while vectors are denoted by lowercase bold-
face letters. The indicator random variable of an event A, which takes value 1 if the event
A occurs and 0 otherwise, is denoted by 1A. The cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of a random variable X is denoted by FX . If two random variables X and Y have the
same distribution, we denote this fact by X d= Y . The positive part of a number x is
denoted by [x]+ = max(x, 0). The set of natural numbers is denoted by N = {0, 1, . . . },
while the set of the first n positive integers is denoted by [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
3.2 Booking Limit Policies
A booking limit is an upper bound on the number of requests than can be accepted for a
particular type of product (for a fare class in the passenger case, and for a certain shipment
type in the cargo case). According to a booking limit policy, requests are accepted as
long as limits are not reached. There are two main types of booking limits: partitioned
and nested. Partitioned booking limits are enforced in a strict fashion, where capacities
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reserved for a particular product type cannot be used to accommodate booking requests
for a different type. However, such restrictive policies can lead to suboptimal results. For
instance, in a passenger booking context it is not desirable to reject a higher fare class
request when there is capacity available for lower fare classes. Therefore, booking limits
are typically used in a hierarchical, or nested, manner. Under a nested policy, higher
ranked classes are allowed to use the capacity reserved for lower ranked classes.
To the best of our knowledge, Amaruchkul et al. (2007) is the only study in the cargo
revenue management literature which develops a partitioned booking limit based policy,
and this thesis is the first to develop nested booking limits. We also remark that in a cargo
context it is possible to establish booking limits in terms of volume and weight capacities
(instead of the number of shipments). While this appears to be a natural approach, we are
not aware of any existing studies featuring such booking limits.
3.2.1 A Two-Phase Method
In this section we describe a two-phase method to obtain a booking limit policy. In the first
phase we determine a total booking limit, then use an EMSR-based capacity allocation
method in the second phase to calculate nested booking limits for various cargo types. A
similar two-phase scheme has been considered for controlling passenger bookings (see,
e.g., Phillips, 2005; Aydin et al., 2010), and Kasilingam (1997) highlights the importance
of such an approach for cargo bookings. However, as existing methods cannot be directly
applied to the cargo case, we need to develop non-trivial extensions.
We note that the methods mentioned above tackle the slightly different problem of de-
termining overbooking limits in the presence of no-shows (and sometimes cancelations).
There are a number of papers in the cargo literature that focus on the initial phase of
finding an overbooking limit in terms of capacity units (Kasilingam, 1997; Moussawi and
Cakanyildirim, 2005; Luo et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, there are no corre-
sponding studies that develop partitioned or nested policies in a two-phase framework.
3.2.1.1 First Phase: Total Booking Limit
In this section we detail two methods to determine a total booking limit. A total booking
limit b can be used to define a greedy policy, which accepts any booking requests regard-
less of cargo type, as long as the total number of reservations is below b. Our goal is to
find booking limits that lead to optimal performance under such a greedy policy.
In our model we consider booking requests that arrive according to a point process dur-
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ing the time period leading up to the departure of a flight. The total number of requests that
arrive during this period is denoted by D; we assume that this non-negative integer ran-
dom variable is bounded, and its distribution is known. Using the greedy policy outlined
above, the total number of accepted booking requests is given by N(b) := min(b,D).
We denote the probability that an individual booking request is for cargo of type i by
pi, i ∈ [m], and assume that the types of various requests are mutually independent. The
probabilities pi, which in our model are considered to be known, necessarily satisfy the
equation
∑m
i=1 pi = 1.
Observation 1 Recalling that the volume of a type-i shipment is distributed as the ran-
dom variable Vi, it is easy to see that the volume of a shipment associated with an in-
dividual booking request of undetermined type has a mixture distribution obtained from
Vi, i ∈ [m], with corresponding mixing weights pi, i ∈ [m]. Formally, the volumes of
shipments are i.i.d. as a random variable V with CDF FV =
∑m
i=1 piFVi . Analogously,
the weights of shipments are i.i.d. as a random variable W with CDF FW =
∑m
i=1 piFWi .
Let us denote the total number of accepted type-i requests by Ni(b). Conditional on
N(b), the values Ni(b), i ∈ [m], follow binomial distributions, while their joint distribu-
tion is multinomial. More precisely, we have
Ni(b)
∣∣∣ (N(b) = n) d= Binomial(n, pi) for i ∈ [m],
(N1(b), . . . , Nm(b))
∣∣∣ (N(b) = n) d= Multinomial(n, p1, . . . , pm).
If we aggregate shipments by type, the total volume of shipments corresponding to
accepted booking requests can be expressed as V r =
∑m
i=1
∑Ni(b)
j=1 Vij . On the other
hand, Observation 1 provides an alternative way to compute the distribution of this total
volume, leading to the following formula:
V r =
m∑
i=1
Ni(b)∑
j=1
Vij
d
=
N(b)∑
j=1
V j, (3.3)
where the random variables V j are i.i.d. as V . The following analogous formula holds
for the total weight:
W r =
m∑
i=1
Ni(b)∑
j=1
Wij
d
=
N(b)∑
j=1
W j , (3.4)
where the random variablesW j are i.i.d. asW . For the sake of completeness, in Appendix
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A we also provide an analytical proof for the above results (stated as the essentially equiv-
alent Lemma 6).
We now proceed to propose two stochastic optimization models that determine total
booking limits; the choice between these two models depends on the decision maker’s
preferences. The first one is a risk-based model which considers the trade-off between
the potential revenue from accepting an additional booking request, and the penalty cost
of an additional off-loaded shipment. The second model aims to find the largest possible
booking limit which still allows the airline to guarantee a certain level of service.
A Risk-Based Model
We now present an optimization problem, adapted from Aydin et al. (2010), where the
goal is to find a total booking limit which maximizes the expected net revenue under the
greedy policy outlined in the beginning of this section.
max
{
m∑
i=1
ρipiE[N(b)] − E[hv(V
r)]− E[hw(W
r)] : b ∈ N
}
(Risk TB)
We can utilize formulas (3.3)-(3.4) to reformulate the above problem. Let us introduce
the function f : N→ R given by
f(b) =
m∑
i=1
ρipib− E
[
hv(
b∑
j=1
V j)
]
− E
[
hw(
b∑
j=1
W j)
]
, (3.5)
where all V j are i.i.d. as the random variable V , while all W j are i.i.d. as W (as intro-
duced in Observation 1). Then we can write problem (Risk TB) as
max {E[f(N(b))] : b ∈ N} . (3.6)
The following two lemmas show that both the function f and the objective function b 7→
E[f(N(b))] are discrete concave.
Lemma 1 Let X1, X2, . . . be i.i.d. non-negative random variables with common CDF
FX , and let h be a non-decreasing convex function. Then the mapping b 7→ E
[
h(
∑b
j=1Xj)
]
is discrete convex.
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that E
[
h
(∑b+1
j=1Xj
)]
− E
[
h
(∑b
j=1Xj
)]
is a non-
decreasing function of b. Using the law of total expectation, we have
E
[
h(
b+1∑
j=1
Xj)
]
− E
[
h(
b∑
j=1
Xj)
]
= E
[
E
[
h(Xb+1 +
b∑
j=1
Xj)− h(
b∑
j=1
Xj)
∣∣∣∣∣Xb+1
]]
=
∫ ∞
0
E
[
h(x+
b∑
j=1
Xj)− h(
b∑
j=1
Xj)
]
dFX(x).
It follows from the convexity of h and the non-negativity of dFX that the above function
is non-decreasing in b, which completes our proof.
Lemma 2 If f is a discrete concave function, then the mapping b 7→ E[f(N(b))] is also
discrete concave.
Proof. Similarly to the previous lemma, it is sufficient to show that the difference
E[f(N(b + 1))] − E[f(N(b))] is a non-increasing function of b. Since D ≤ b implies
N(b+ 1) = N(b) = D, we have
E[f(N(b+1))]−E[f(N(b))] = E[f(N(b+1))−f(N(b))] = P(D ≥ b+1)(f(b+1)−f(b)).
As the function f is discrete concave, f(b+ 1)− f(b) is non-increasing in b. In addition,
the probability P(D ≥ b+1) is clearly also a non-increasing function of b, which implies
the desired result.
Interestingly, under our assumptions the optimal total booking limit does not depend
on the distribution of the number of booking requests. For the proof of the following
result we refer the reader to Aydin et al. (2010).
Lemma 3 If f is a discrete concave function and the problem max{f(b) : b ∈ N}
has a finite optimal solution bOPT, then this is also an optimal solution of the problem
max {E [f (N(b))] : b ∈ N}.
Since Lemmas 1 and 2 show that the objective function of (3.6) is discrete concave,
we can obtain an optimal solution as follows.
bOPT = inf{b ∈ N : E[f(N(b+ 1))]− E[f(N(b))] < 0}. (3.7)
Taking into account Lemma 3, the above formula can be further simplified:
bOPT = inf{b ∈ N : f(b+ 1)− f(b) < 0}. (3.8)
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We note that since the total number of booking requests is bounded from above, it is
sufficient to consider a bounded range of possible booking limits. It follows that we can
replace the inf operator in (3.8) by min, and perform a discrete one-dimensional search
to obtain an optimal solution bOPT. To numerically evaluate the function f during this
search, one can use Monte Carlo simulation, or, under certain additional assumptions,
use analytical approximations. In Appendix C we provide additional details on how to
perform the necessary calculations, and discuss a normal approximation.
A Service Level Based Model
Service level constraints are often considered in the passenger revenue management lit-
erature in order to control the extent of overbooking. For example, a type-I service level
constraint imposes the requirement that the probability of overbooking be less than or
equal to a specified value (see, e.g., Phillips, 2005). To the best of our knowledge, similar
constraints have not yet been discussed in the cargo literature. In this section we aim
to introduce this approach in a cargo context, taking into account the multi-dimensional
capacity requirements. We propose a constraint that limits the probability of oversale,
i.e., of the event that either the total volume or the total weight of accepted shipments
exceeds the available capacity. This leads to the following alternative to the risk based
model (Risk TB):
max

b ∈ N : P

N(b)∑
j=1
V j ≥ Cv OR
N(b)∑
j=1
W j ≥ Cw

 ≤ 1− α

 , (Service TB)
where α is a specified service level (such as 0.95). One can use a Monte Carlo simula-
tion method to approximate the probability of oversale, which is typically hard compute
otherwise.
3.2.1.2 Second Phase: EMSR-Based Heuristics
In passenger revenue management, booking limits are typically used in a nested fash-
ion, where the capacity that is available for sale to a particular fare class can also be
sold to a more expensive fare class. Littlewood’s rule (Littlewood, 1972) provides a well-
known method to optimally determine such booking limits for the case of two fare classes.
Heuristics based on expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) (Belobaba, 1987; 1989) ex-
tend Littlewood’s rule to multiple classes, and are widely used to find nested booking
limits. The popularity of EMSR-based methods is in a large part due to their intuitive
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and practical nature (see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005), which motivates us to de-
velop similar heuristics for cargo bookings. Before we present our methods, we briefly
outline the EMSR-based approach as it is used in the passenger literature, then discuss
the challenges that arise when one attempts to adapt this methodology to a cargo context.
EMSR in Passenger Booking
Let us consider a passenger flight with C seats available for sale to m classes of pas-
sengers, and assume that passenger classes are indexed in decreasing order of revenue
values, i.e., ρ1 ≥ · · · ≥ ρm. In accordance with common practice in the literature, instead
of referring to booking limits we can equivalently describe booking controls in terms of
protection levels. These levels can be viewed as the complements of booking limits with
respect to the capacity available for sale, and represent the amount of capacity saved for
various classes of products. More precisely, the jth protection level, which we denote by
yj , is the amount of capacity saved for sale to classes j and lower. Protection levels form
an increasing sequence y1 ≤ · · · ≤ ym = C, and thus define a nested structure.
There are two main types of EMSR heuristics to determine protection levels. EMSR-a
first calculates protection levels by applying Littlewood’s rule to successive fare classes,
then aggregates these to obtain the protection levels which define the booking policy.
Since EMSR-a ignores statistical averaging effects, it has a tendency to produce protec-
tion levels that are overly conservative. EMSR-b addresses this issue by aggregating the
demand across classes (instead of aggregating protection levels). While some studies
that compare these heuristics have shown mixed results (see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin,
2005), EMSR-b appears to be more popular in practice, and is considered to generally
perform better than EMSR-a. Accordingly, in this thesis we focus on EMSR-b. Before
attempting to adapt this heuristic to a cargo context, we provide a short formal description
of the method in the passenger case.
Let Di denote the random total demand for class-i seats. At stage j of the EMSR-
b heuristic we compute how much capacity to protect for the classes j, j − 1, . . . , 1 as
follows.
yˆj = max
{
y ∈ {0, . . . , C} : ρj+1 − ρjP
(
j∑
i=1
Di ≥ y
)
≤ 0,
}
, j ∈ [m−1], (3.9)
where ρj denotes the weighted-average revenue, calculated as ρj =
∑j
i=1 ρiE[Di]∑j
i=1 E[Di]
. Since the
yˆj values are not guaranteed to form a non-decreasing sequence, we define the protection
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levels as
yj = max{yˆ1, . . . , yˆj}, j ∈ [m− 1].
The main challenge in applying EMSR-b is to calculate the distributions of the aggre-
gated demands that appear in (3.9). We list here some approaches that lead to tractable
formulations under appropriate modeling assumptions.
• If the demands Di, i ∈ [m], are i.i.d with Poisson or normal distribution, the
distributions of the aggregated demands are of the same respective type.
• More generally, if Di, i ∈ [m], are independent, we can numerically calculate
the distributions of the aggregated demands using the fast Fourier transform (FFT)
method (see, e.g., Tijms, 2003).
• If the demands Di are not independent, but have a multinomial structure (similar
to the situation outlined in Section 3.2.1.1), then the aggregated demands follow
binomial distributions.
Adapting EMSR Methodology to Cargo Booking
In the passenger case, every accepted booking request consumes one uniform seat,
therefore fare classes with higher revenues are always more profitable. This property
leads to a naturally defined nested structure, based solely on revenue values. In contrast,
cargo shipments have capacity requirements in multiple dimensions. A shipment which
brings higher revenue may consume more capacity, and therefore be less profitable, than
another shipment which brings lower revenue. Defining a nested structure among cargo
types is therefore a highly non-trivial problem. Analogously to EMSR-b, we aim to find
appropriate coefficients ̺i, associated with each cargo type i ∈ [m], that quantify the
marginal profitability of type-i shipments.
We now turn our attention to the problem of finding suitable profitability coefficients.
We take as our starting point the following two-dimensional knapsack problem, which
provides capacity allocations based on expected demands and expected capacity require-
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ments.
max
m∑
i=1
ρixi
subject to
m∑
i=1
µvixi ≤ Cv
m∑
i=1
µwi xi ≤ Cw
xi ≤ E[Di] i = 1, . . . , m
xi ∈ N i = 1, . . . , m
(KS Alloc)
We refer to the continuous relaxation of the above integer program as (RKS Alloc). Sim-
ilar knapsack-based allocation models are widely used in the passenger booking literature
to obtain bid-prices (see Section 3.3). In a cargo context, Amaruchkul et al. (2007) con-
sider the problem (RKS Alloc), while Pak and Dekker (2004) utilize the 0-1 version of
(KS Alloc) in an on-line booking system. Along these lines, we propose three types
of profitability coefficients based on knapsack formulations, which in turn define cor-
responding nested structures for our cargo booking policies. Intuitively, a profitability
coefficient ̺i can be interpreted as the ratio of the net revenue and some scalar measure
of the capacity requirements associated with shipments of type i.
Type 1: Based on effective capacity Akc¸ay et al. (2007) propose a greedy algo-
rithm to solve multi-dimensional knapsack problems. They consider the effective ca-
pacity for an item, which in our context can be computed for shipments of type i as
min(⌊Cv
µvi
⌋, ⌊Cw
µwi
⌋). Their greedy algorithm then ranks items based on the product of as-
sociated revenue and effective capacity. Accordingly, we introduce the following coeffi-
cients:
̺i = ρimin(⌊
Cv
µvi
⌋, ⌊
Cw
µwi
⌋), i ∈ [m]. (3.10)
Note that the inverse of the effective capacity for a cargo type can be viewed as the “ef-
fective capacity requirement” of type-i shipments.
Type 2: Based on weighted sums of expected capacity requirements Another
class of greedy algorithms to solve multi-dimensional knapsack problems, proposed by
Rinnooy Kan et al. (1993), ranks items based on the ratio of their profit and a weighted
sum of their capacity requirements. Accordingly, for any positive weights αv and αw, we
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can consider coefficients of the form
̺i =
ρi
αvµvi + αwµ
w
i
, i ∈ [m]. (3.11)
Note that under the non-restrictive assumption αv + αw = 1 the denominator becomes a
weighted average of capacity requirements. Rinnooy Kan et al. (1993) propose a simple
method, based on combinatorial enumeration, to determine weights that lead to optimal
performance of the greedy algorithm. For the sake of completeness, in Appendix F we
briefly describe how to obtain these optimal weights.
Remark 2 Pak and Dekker (2004) use the optimal weights in a cargo context to obtain
bid-prices for units of capacity. Along these lines, it is always possible to define prof-
itability coefficients based on bid-prices. Given respective bid-prices λv and λw for units
of volume and weight, one can calculate a scalar measure of the capacity requirements of
type-i cargo as the weighted average λvµ
v
i+λwµ
w
i
λv+λw
. Omitting a constant factor, this leads to
the following coefficients:
̺i =
ρi
λvµvi + λwµ
w
i
, i ∈ [m].
Type 3: Based on a Lagrangian approach One-dimensional continuous knapsack
problems can be solved optimally by a simple greedy approach, which ranks items ac-
cording to the ratio of their value and either their volume or their weight. To make use
of this natural ordering, we consider continuous Lagrangian relaxations of (RKS Alloc),
where one of the capacity constraints is dropped, and a term that penalizes its violation
amount is added to the objective function. For example, if we relax the weight capacity
constraint, we obtain the following Lagrangian relaxation:
max
m∑
i=1
ρixi + λw
(
Cw −
m∑
i=1
µwi xi
)
subject to
m∑
i=1
µvi xi ≤ Cv
xi ≤ E[Di] i = 1, . . . , m.
(LRPw)
For any fixed value of the Lagrange multiplier λw the above linear program can be viewed
as a continuous knapsack problem, where type-i shipments correspond to items of value
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ρi − λwµ
w
i and volume µvi . Accordingly, we can define profitability coefficients as
̺i =
ρi − λwµ
w
i
µvi
, i ∈ [m]. (3.12)
If we rank cargo types according to these coefficients, then, as mentioned above, we
can find an optimal solution to problem (LRPw) by using a greedy algorithm. As an
alternative to (LRPw), we can consider the Lagrangian relaxation obtained by dropping
the volume capacity constraint. Analogously to the previous case, we arrive at profitability
coefficients of the form
̺i =
ρi − λvµ
v
i
µwi
, i ∈ [m]. (3.13)
It remains to provide suitable values for the Lagrangian multipliers λw and λv. A natural
choice is to use the optimal dual variables associated with the capacity constraints in the
LP (RKS Alloc). In this case both of the Lagrangian relaxations have the same optimal
solution as (RKS Alloc), in accordance with the theory of LP duality. Notice that the
Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted as shadow prices. In the passenger literature it
is common practice to use shadow prices from randomized LP formulations (see, e.g.,
Talluri and van Ryzin, 1999). Along similar lines, in Section 3.3.1 we outline a method to
obtain Lagrange multipliers λw and λv by solving a randomized version of (RKS Alloc).
If the profitability coefficients are given based on one of the three methods, one can
use Algorithm 1 to obtain EMSR-type protection levels.
3.2.2 A Risk-Based Model for Partitioned Booking Limits
As an alternative to the two-phase method, we present a risk-based model, originally
introduced for passenger bookings by Aydin et al. (2010), that obtains partitioned booking
limits without relying on a predefined total booking limit. The goal is to maximize the
expected total net revenue, defined as the difference between the expected revenue from
the accepted booking requests, and the expected total off-loading cost paid as a penalty
for not shipping booked cargo.
As before, we denote the number of type-i booking requests by Di, i ∈ [m], and
assume that these random variables are bounded, and their distributions are known. How-
ever, due to our use of approximation methods, knowledge of the joint distribution is not
necessary. If bi denotes a booking limit for type-i cargo, the number of accepted type-i
booking requests is given by Ni(bi) = min(bi, Di). If we denote an upper bound of the
random variable Di by Mi then, as the inequality bi > Mi implies Ni(bi) = Ni(Mi),
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Algorithm 1 Two Phase Method for Computing the Nested Booking Limits
1: [INPUTS] Cargo types are ordered according to their profitability coefficients, i.e.,
̺1 ≥ · · · ≥ ̺m. Denote the total number of type-i booking requests that arrive during
the booking period by Di. The joint distribution of D1, . . . , Dm is given.
2: [FIRST PHASE] Define a total booking limit b. A suitable value can be found by
solving either problem (Risk TB) or problem (Service TB).
3: [SECOND PHASE] Analogously to (3.9), compute protection levels via the follow-
ing formula:
yˆj = max
{
y ∈ {0, . . . , b} : ̺j+1 − ̺jP
(
j∑
i=1
Di ≥ y
)
≤ 0,
}
, j ∈ [m− 1],
where ̺j denotes the weighted-average profitability, calculated as ̺j =
∑j
i=1 ̺iE[Di]∑j
i=1 E[Di]
.
To ensure that protection levels are non-decreasing, we again set
yj = max{yˆ1, . . . , yˆj}, j ∈ [m− 1].
we can restrict ourselves to only considering booking limit policies given by vectors
b = (b1, . . . , bm) in the set B = {b ∈ Nm : b1 ≤M1, . . . , bm ≤Mm}. Using this nota-
tion, we can express the expected total net revenue under a booking policy given by some
b ∈ B as follows:
φ(b) =
m∑
i=1
ρiE[Ni(bi)]− E

hv

 m∑
i=1
Ni(bi)∑
j=1
Vij

+ hw

 m∑
i=1
Ni(bi)∑
j=1
Wij



 , (3.14)
However, the corresponding optimization model, given by
max {φ(b) : b ∈ B} , (3.15)
is typically very difficult to solve, as φ is not a separable function of the booking limits. To
overcome this issue, we now describe an upper bound for φ that gives rise to a separable
formulation.
Proposition 4 The function φU : B → R given by
φU(b) =
m∑
i=1
ρiE[Ni(bi)]− hv
(
m∑
i=1
E[Ni(bi)]µ
v
i
)
− hw
(
m∑
i=1
E[Ni(bi)]µ
w
i
)
provides an upper bound for the function φ defined in (3.14)
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Proof. Let us recall that the functions hv and hw are convex, and that, according to our
notation, we have E[Vij ] = µvi , i ∈ [m], j ∈ [Ni(bi)]. Then Jensen’s inequality implies
that, for all b ∈ Nm, the following holds:
E

hv

 m∑
i=1
Ni(bi)∑
j=1
Vij



 ≥ hv

E

 m∑
i=1
Ni(bi)∑
j=1
Vij



 = hv
(
m∑
i=1
E[Ni(bi)]µ
v
i
)
.
As an analogous inequality is valid for the weight penalty term, our claim follows.
If we now replace the net revenue function φ(b) by its upper bound φU(b) in (3.15), we
arrive at an approximate problem:
max
{
φU(b) : b ∈ B
}
. (RiskD)
When the off-loading cost functions hv and hw are defined as in (3.1), we can use a
standard linearization of the positive part function to cast (RiskD) as a mixed integer
program. Let us introduce the binary decision variables xij , i ∈ [m], j ∈ {0, . . . ,Mi},
to represent the indicators 1bi=j . Furthermore, to simplify our notation, let us define
aij = E[Ni(j)] = E [min(j,Di)] for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ {0, . . . ,Mi}. Since the distributions
of the random variables Di are known, these expected values can easily be computed.
Then, similarly to Aydin et al. (2010), we arrive at the following formulation:
max
m∑
i=1
ρi
Mi∑
j=0
aijxij − θvϑv − θwϑw (3.16)
subject to ϑv ≥
m∑
i=1
µvi
Mi∑
j=0
aijxij − Cv (3.17)
ϑv ≥ 0 (3.18)
ϑw ≥
m∑
i=1
µwi
Mi∑
j=0
aijxij − Cw (3.19)
ϑw ≥ 0 (3.20)
Mi∑
j=0
xij = 1 i = 1, . . . , m (3.21)
xij ∈ {0, 1} i = 1, . . . , m, j = 0, . . . ,Mi. (3.22)
Proposition 5 Let functions hv and hw be defined as in (3.1), and let (x∗, ϑ∗v, ϑ∗w) be an
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optimal solution of the problem (3.16)-(3.22). Then the booking limits bx∗i =
∑Mi
j=1 jx
∗
ij ,
i ∈ [m], provide an optimal solution of (RiskD). In addition, the two problems have the
same optimum value, i.e., if we let φˆ(x, ϑv, ϑw) denote the objective expression given in
(3.16), we have the equality φˆ(x∗, ϑ∗v, ϑ∗w) = φU(bx∗).
Proof. Assume that x = (xij)i∈[m],j∈{0,...,Mi} satisfies the constraints (3.21)-(3.22). It is
easy to see that, for every i ∈ [m], exactly one of the binary variables xi0, xi1, . . . , xiMi
takes value 1. It follows that the sum bxi =
∑Mi
j=1 jxij belongs to the set {0, . . . ,Mi},
and thus the vector bx is a feasible solution of (RiskD). Let us introduce the additional
notation
ϑxv =
[
m∑
i=1
µvi
Mi∑
j=0
aijxij − Cv
]
+
, ϑxw =
[
m∑
i=1
µwi
Mi∑
j=0
aijxij − Cw
]
+
,
and note that (x, ϑxv , ϑxw) satisfies all of the constraints (3.17)-(3.22), and has an objective
value of φˆ(x, ϑxv , ϑxw) = φU(bx). In addition, constraints (3.17)-(3.20) imply that the in-
equalities ϑv ≥ ϑxv and ϑw ≥ ϑxw hold for any other feasible solution (x, ϑv, ϑw), therefore
we have φˆ(x, ϑv, ϑw) ≤ φˆ(x, ϑxv , ϑxw).
On the other hand, let us consider an arbitrary solution b of (RiskD), and define xij =
1bi=j . It is clear that x satisfies the constraints (3.21)-(3.22), and bx = b holds. Therefore,
taking into account the optimality of (x∗, ϑ∗v, ϑ∗w), we can combine our previous results to
prove our claim as follows:
φU(b) = φU(bx) = φˆ(x, ϑxv , ϑ
x
w) ≤ φˆ(x
∗, ϑ∗v, ϑ
∗
w) ≤ φˆ(x
∗, ϑx
∗
v , ϑ
x
∗
w ) = φ
U(bx
∗
).
We note that the proposed formulation (3.16)-(3.22) can be efficiently solved by a
standard mixed integer programming solver such as CPLEX as illustrated in Chapter 4.
3.3 Bid-Price Policies
Bid-price policies make accept/reject decisions for booking requests by comparing their
net revenues to a threshold price. In a cargo context, these thresholds are based on bid-
prices for units of volume and weight capacities, and can be interpreted as marginal values
of the capacity resources. Given such bid-prices, one can obtain a threshold price for a
given type of cargo by adding up the prices of expected volume and weight requirements
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of a shipment; see (3.23).
Bid-prices can be updated periodically during the booking process, based on the re-
maining available capacity, the time to departure, and expectations about the future de-
mand. This widely used approach (see, e.g., Kunnumkal et al., 2012; Levin et al., 2011)
leads to dynamic booking policies which lie outside of the scope of this thesis. However,
in lieu of updates to the bid-price, it is necessary to introduce additional controls to pre-
vent oversale. In our proposed policies we adopt the following rule: the expected capacity
requirements of accepted shipments are not allowed to exceed available capacities.
Let λv and λw denote bid-prices for unit volume and weight capacities, respectively.
Then, in accordance with the principles outlined above, an arriving type-i booking request
is accepted if and only the following conditions hold:
ρi ≥ µ
v
iλv + µ
w
i λw, µ
v
i ≤ Cv − z
v, and µwi ≤ Cw − zw, (3.23)
where zv and zw denote the total expected volume and weight capacity requirements of al-
ready accepted shipments. Notice that the net revenue ρi is being compared to the thresh-
old price µviλv + µwi λw, which expresses the price of the expected capacity requirements
of a type-i shipment.
In this section we first consider an approach based on a widely used method in the
passenger literature (Simpson, 1992; Williamson, 1992), which computes bid prices as the
optimal values of dual variables associated with the capacity constraints in a deterministic
capacity assignment LP. Amaruchkul et al. (2007) propose the use of such an LP-based
heuristic (not incorporating off-loading costs) in a single-leg cargo context. We extend
their model by using a randomized method originally proposed by Talluri and van Ryzin
(1999) for controlling passenger bookings over networks.
All of the models discussed so far either ignore off-loading costs, or make the common
simplifying assumption that these costs can be separated in an additive fashion, as in
(3.1). In contrast, Levin et al. (2011) propose an optimization problem which determines
which shipments are to be off-loaded; a similar approach has also been suggested in the
passenger literature by Bertsimas and Popescu (2003), and Kunnumkal et al. (2012). The
latter study provides a two-stage framework for network revenue management, extending
the RLP methods proposed by Talluri and van Ryzin (1999). In the second half of this
section we describe a way to compute bid-prices using a similar RLP model, which allows
us to consider off-loading costs as a more accurate function of the capacity requirements
of accepted reservations.
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We mention here two other relevant studies: Han et al. (2010) model the single-leg
booking process by a discrete-time Markov chain and compute bid-prices that maximize
expected revenue, while Pak and Dekker (2004) consider a two-dimensional on-line knap-
sack formulation for networks, and use the greedy algorithm proposed in Rinnooy Kan
et al. (1993) to solve this problem and compute bid-prices. Both studies assume that no
penalty is incurred when a booking request is rejected, and that capacity requirements
are known with certainty when a booking request arrives. Due to their practicality, we
consider the methods proposed in Amaruchkul et al. (2007) and Pak and Dekker (2004)
as benchmarks in our computational study.
3.3.1 A Traditional Randomized Linear Programming Method
Deterministic LP formulations, based on the expected values of the random demands,
have been widely used to compute bid-prices for passenger booking in a network context
(Simpson, 1992; Williamson, 1992). Amaruchkul et al. (2007) consider a similar deter-
ministic LP model for a single-leg cargo capacity control problem; their formulation is
essentially equivalent to the problem (RKS Alloc). This approach analyzes a scenario
when various random variables take on their expected values, which might not be suffi-
cient to capture the randomness inherent in the booking process. As an alternative to de-
terministic LPs, Talluri and van Ryzin (1999) propose the use of RLPs to obtain bid-prices
for controlling passenger bookings in the absence of no-shows, i.e., under the assumption
that all the passengers with a reservation show up at the departure time. We adapt this
approach to a cargo context, and introduce an RLP-based method to compute bid-prices
for volume and weight capacities. The underlying idea is to use a Monte Carlo simulation
to estimate the total demands, instead of relying on expected values.
Suppose that dk, k ∈ [K], are K independent samples of the random total demand
vector D = {Di, i ∈ [m]}. To obtain the RLP under the kth sample, we replace the
expected total demand E[Di] by dki for all i ∈ [m] in the allocation problem (RKS Alloc):
max{
m∑
i=1
ρixi : 0 ≤ xi ≤ d
k
i , i ∈ [m],
m∑
i=1
µvixi ≤ Cv,
m∑
i=1
µwi xi ≤ Cw}
(Random RKS)
We solve the above RLP to find the optimal dual variables λvk and λwk associated with the
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capacity constraints. Then, bid-prices can be calculated by averaging over all samples:
λv =
1
K
K∑
k=1
λvk, λw =
1
K
K∑
k=1
λwk.
Remark 3 Consider a discrete-time framework, where the booking horizon is divided in
T time periods and T is sufficiently large so that there is at most one booking request
arrives in each time period. Suppose that we are given the probabilities of observing a
particular type of cargo at each time period: P (Dit = 1) = pit for all i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ].
Then, alternatively, we can generate independent samples of D = {Dit, i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ]}
instead of D = {Di, i ∈ [m]}. In this case, denoting the demands under kth sample by dkit
we replace E[Di] by
∑
t∈T d
k
it for all i ∈ [m]. In our computational study, we assume that
we are given pit parameters. However, by using the FFT method, we can exactly compute
the distributions of Di, i ∈ [m] and still generate samples of D = {Di, i ∈ [m]}.
While the above model incorporates the randomness in the number of booking re-
quests, it does not account for the uncertainty in the capacity requirements of individual
shipments. In the next section we present a two-stage approach that addresses this issue.
3.3.2 A Two-Stage Randomized Linear Programming Method
In this section we develop a two-stage RLP model following the template laid out by
Kunnumkal et al. (2012): booking decisions are made in the first stage, and off-loading
decisions are made in the second stage. Using a Monte Carlo approach, we first gener-
ate K samples of the demand distribution, then solve a two-stage LP for each sample.
Similarly to our previous RLP method, we compute bid-prices by averaging over all K
samples the optimal dual variables associated with capacity constraints.
In order to arrive at a tractable formulation, we need to make additional assumptions
about the demand structure. In accordance with common practice in the literature, we
divide the booking horizon into T time periods, where departure occurs at the end of
the T th period. We make the standard assumption that T is sufficiently large so that no
two booking requests arrive in the same time period. We denote the probability that a
booking request for type-i cargo arrives in period t by pit, for i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ]. The
random demand for type-i cargo in period t, denoted by Dit, then follows a Bernoulli
distribution with success probability pit. We note that the demands D1t, . . . , Dmt for a
given time period t, together with the indicator of the event that no requests arrive in the
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period, follow a multinomial joint distribution. We next describe a two-stage model under
a given sample realization
(
dkit
)
i∈[m],t∈[T ]
of these demands.
Booking decisions for shipments are made without knowledge of their exact future
capacity requirements. At the departure time, when these requirements are realized, we
determine which accepted shipments should be off-loaded. Let xkit represent the number
of type-i shipments accepted in time period t, and let ykit represent the number of these
shipments that are off-loaded. If the random volume and weight requirements are given
by the pair of random vectors (Vk,Wk), we have the following first-stage problem:
max
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ρix
k
it − E[Q(x
k,Vk,Wk)] (3.24)
s. t. 0 ≤ xkit ≤ d
k
it i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ], (3.25)
where E[Q(xk,V,W)] denotes the expected second-stage off-loading costs. For given
booking decisions xk and a given realization (vks,wks) of the random capacity require-
ments (Vk,Wk), the off-loading decisions and costs are given by the optimal solution of
the following second-stage LP:
Q(xk,vks,wks) = min
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
cksit y
k
it (3.26)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
vksit (x
k
it − y
k
it) ≤ Cv (3.27)
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wksit (x
k
it − y
k
it) ≤ Cw (3.28)
0 ≤ ykit ≤ x
k
it i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ], (3.29)
where cksit denotes the penalty cost paid for off-loading a shipment of volume vksit and
weight wksit . We point out that constraints (3.27)-(3.28) ensure that the total volume and
weight requirements of boarded shipments do not exceed the respective available capaci-
ties of the flight.
Remark 4 It is possible to approximate the standard off-loading cost function given in
(3.1) by setting cksit = θvvksit + θwwksit . On the other hand, Levin et al. (2011) consider
penalty costs for type-i cargo to be proportional to the shipping rate ri, and computed as
cksit = ri(0.15v
ks
it + 1.5w
ks
it ). We also consider the penalty cost cksit to be a deterministic
function of the capacity requirements vsit and wsit, hence the omission of cks from the
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arguments of the function Q. However, this is not a necessary assumption; our approach
can accommodate arbitrary choices of cksit . Similarly, we can incorporate uncertainty in
available volume and weight capacities into our model by replacing Cw and Cv by Cksw
and Cksv , respectively. However, it is potentially very challenging to generate scenarios
that accurately represent the joint distributions of all random parameters .
It is possible to obtain a point estimation of the expected off-loading costsE[Q(xk,Vk,Wk)]
via Monte Carlo simulation as follows. Let us generate L samples (vks,wks), s ∈
[L], of the random capacity requirements, then obtain corresponding off-loading costs
Q(xk,vks,wks) by solving the second-stage LP, and finally take the average of these costs
across all L samples. Accordingly, we can combine our first-stage problem (3.24)-(3.25)
and our second-stage problem (3.26)-(3.29) into a single large-scale LP:
max
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ρix
k
it −
1
L
L∑
s=1
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
csity
ks
it (3.30)
s. t. 0 ≤ xkit ≤ d
k
it i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ], (3.31)
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
vksit (x
k
it − y
ks
it ) ≤ Cv s ∈ [L], (3.32)
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wksit (x
k
it − y
ks
it ) ≤ Cw s ∈ [L], (3.33)
0 ≤ yksit ≤ x
k
it i ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [L]. (3.34)
Let us solve the above two-stage model for each of the K demand realizations, and let
λˆksv and λˆksw denote the optimal values of the dual variables corresponding to the capacity
constraints (3.32) and (3.33), respectively. Then, similarly to the traditional RLP method,
we can set the bid-prices for unit volume and weight capacities as
λv =
1
K
K∑
j=1
L∑
s=1
λˆksv , λw =
1
K
K∑
j=1
L∑
s=1
λˆksw .
3.3.2.1 Solving the Two-Stage Model
For a given demand sample, the proposed large-scale LP formulation given by (3.30)-
(3.34) involves mLT decision variables and O(mLT ) constraints. Depending on the size
of the problem instances, it can be computationally challenging to solve this problem.
In our computational study, we use the Monte Carlo approach with K = 25 samples
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when drawing first-stage parameters, and L = 200 samples for each set of second-stage
parameters. For instances with m = 240, we could easily solve the resulting problems
using CPLEX. However, if solving the large-scale LP formulation eventually becomes a
computational bottleneck, one can use the well-known L-shaped method (Van Slyke and
Wets, 1969), a widely applied Benders-decomposition approach (Benders, 1962) to solve
two-stage stochastic programming problems with the expected recourse functions for the
case of a finite probability space. For a detailed discussion on the L-shaped method, we
refer the reader to Van Slyke and Wets (1969), Birge and Louveaux (1997) and Pre´kopa
(1995). In our setup, this decomposition based approach requires to solve the second-
stage problem for each sample of volume and weight requirements in order to obtain
the subgradient inequalities for the total off-loading cost function. Observe that using a
change of variables (y˜it = xit − yit) we can formulate the second-stage problem under
each realization as a continuous relaxation of the multiple knapsack problem (MKP) with
two constraints:
Q(x,vs,ws) = csitxit
−max{
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
csity˜it :
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
vsity˜it ≤ Cv,
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wsity˜it ≤ Cw, 0 ≤ y˜ ≤ x}.
The relaxed MKP problem can be solved using a off-the-shelf software such as CPLEX.
One can also solve it using an alternative approach. For this special class of MKP, we
can use the Lagrangian method penalizing the violation of one of the capacity constraints,
which leads to the well-known continuous knapsack problem. Thus, for a given La-
grangian multiplier associated with a capacity constraint, we have an analytical expression
for the optimal solution of a Lagrangian relaxation of the second-stage problem. Then,
we can optimize over the single Lagrange multiplier to obtain an optimal solution of the
second-stage problem. Such an approach has been proposed by Martello and Toth (2003)
to solve the continuous relaxation of the MKP with two constraints.
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Chapter 4
Implementation Details and Computational Study
In this chapter, we first discuss in detail how different booking policies are implemented.
Then, we describe our simulation setup and explain how we set the values of the input
parameters used in the presented models. We also briefly describe the policies used as
benchmarks and provide insights about the performance of different policies.
4.1 Implementing Cargo Booking Policies
In this section we outline various ways to implement open loop cargo booking policies for
use in practice, or for the purpose of evaluation by simulations. We also describe methods
to convert between different types of booking controls.
4.1.1 General Implementation Notes
In Section 3.3 we introduce the rule that, when we employing a bid-price policy, we do
not accept booking requests for shipments that would bring the total expected capacity
requirements (either volume or weight) for the flight over the available capacity. In our
implementations we adopt this rule for all booking policies. This practice has been sug-
gested by Pak and Dekker (2004) and Amaruchkul et al. (2007); the latter study states
that adopting it leads to improved performance. We have also observed that this practice,
which considers the capacity constraints given in (3.23), has significantly improved the
performance of our booking policies.
As we briefly touched upon in Section 3.3, open loop methods are often used with a
rolling horizon scheme, where booking controls (i.e., booking limits, or bid-prices) are
32
periodically updated to take into account changes in available capacity and/or changes in
predicted demands. Such approaches, which occupy a position between static and fully
dynamic booking policies, are outside the scope of our thesis.
In practice, partitioned booking limits are rarely implemented directly; instead, they
are usually converted to a nested policy. This conversion can be performed naturally in
the passenger case, since net revenues define a unique ranking between the fare classes.
In Section 4.1.3 we discuss how to perform similar conversions for cargo booking limits.
In our computational results we only report the performance of nested implementations
of partitioned booking limits; the reason for this decision is that nested implementations
consistently outperform partitioned ones to a significant degree.
4.1.2 Implementing Booking Limit Policies
We consider booking requests that arrive in sequence. When a request arrives, we make an
accept/reject decision based on our current booking limits, and if the request is accepted,
we update the booking limits to reflect the decrease in available capacity.
Partitioned booking limits
Let b1(t), . . . , bm(t) denote the booking limits for various cargo types after accepting t
booking requests. A new request for type-i cargo is accepted if and only if we have
bi(t) ≥ 1. If the request is accepted, we decrease type-i limit, and leave the other limits
unchanged. That is, we set bi(t + 1) = bi(t)− 1, and bj(t + 1) = bj(t) for j 6= i.
Nested booking limits
We note that there are two ways of implementing nested booking policies: standard nest-
ing and theft nesting. Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) state that “standard nesting is the norm
in revenue management practice”. Accordingly, in our study, we only consider this more
natural approach, and refer the reader to Haerian et al. (2006) for a detailed description of
theft nesting. The nested booking limit b¯i denotes the maximum total number of booking
requests that we intend to accept for cargo types i, . . . , m.
Let b¯1(t) ≥ · · · ≥ b¯m(t) denote the nested booking limits after accepting t booking
requests. A new request for type-i cargo is accepted if and only if we have b¯i(t) ≥ 1 .
If the request is accepted, we decrease the booking limits for cargo types 1, . . . , i, and
update other limits to preserve the nested structure. That is, we set b¯j(t + 1) = b¯j(t) − 1
for j ≤ i, and b¯j(t + 1) = min(b¯j(t), b¯i(t+ 1)) for j > i.
33
Capacity-based booking limits
Instead of considering limits on the number of accepted booking requests, it is natural to
consider limits on the expected capacity requirements. Such limits represent volume and
weight capacities that are made available to cargo of various types. Accordingly, upon
accepting a booking request for a shipment, the appropriate limits are decreased by the
expected volume and weight of this shipment.
Partitioned capacity limits LetBv1(t), . . . , Bvm(t) andBw1 (t), . . . , Bwm(t) denote the
volume and weight limits, respectively, for various cargo types after accepting t booking
requests. A new request for type-i cargo is accepted if and only if we have Bvi (t) ≥ µvi
and Bwi (t) ≥ µwi . If the request is accepted, we decrease type-i limits, and leave the other
limits unchanged. That is, we set
Bvi (t+ 1) = B
v
i (t)− µ
v
i
Bwi (t+ 1) = B
w
i (t)− µ
w
i
Bvj (t+ 1) = B
v
j (t) j 6= i
Bwj (t+ 1) = B
w
j (t) j 6= i.
Nested capacity limits Let B¯v1(t) ≥ · · · ≥ B¯vm(t) and B¯w1 (t) ≥ · · · ≥ B¯wm(t) the
nested capacity limits after accepting t booking requests. A new request for type-i cargo
is accepted if and only if we have B¯vi (t) ≥ µvi and B¯wi (t) ≥ µwi . If the request is accepted,
we decrease the limits for shipments of type 1, . . . , i, and update other limits to preserve
the nested structure. That is, we set
B¯vj (t+ 1) = B¯
v
j (t)− µ
v
i j ≤ i
B¯wj (t+ 1) = B¯
w
j (t)− µ
w
i j ≤ i
B¯vj (t+ 1) = min
(
B¯vj (t), B¯
v
i (t+ 1)
)
j > i
B¯wj (t+ 1) = min
(
B¯wj (t), B¯
w
i (t + 1)
)
j > i.
4.1.3 Conversions Between Booking Controls
We have discussed several classes of booking controls, including partitioned and nested
booking limits, expressed both in terms of the number of booking requests and in terms of
capacity. We now describe some ways in which a cargo booking policy based on controls
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of a certain class can be converted to a related (but not necessarily equivalent) policy
based on controls of a different class.
Conversion between nested booking limits and protection levels
In the EMSR literature, and accordingly in our related Section 3.2.1.2, nested booking
policies are described in terms of protection levels y1 ≤ . . . ym. Here the level yi denotes
the maximal number of booking requests that can be accepted for cargo types 1, . . . , i.
Protection levels can be interpreted as “protecting” available capacity for requests with
high profitability. In contrast, nested booking limits express the amounts of capacity made
available for requests of lower profitability. These two conventions provide equivalent
descriptions of nested booking policies, and we can convert protection levels to nested
booking limits via the following simple formulas:
b¯1 = ym, b¯i = yi − yi−1 for i = 2, . . . , m.
Conversion to capacity limits
Instead of considering limits on the number of accepted booking requests, it is natural to
consider limits on the expected capacity requirements of accepted requests. If b1, . . . , bm
are partitioned booking limits, we can define corresponding booking limits in terms of
volume as Bvi = biµvi , and in terms of weight as Bwi = biµwi , for i ∈ [m]. Similarly, given
nested booking limits b¯1 ≥ · · · ≥ b¯m, we can define corresponding nested capacity limits
as
B¯vi = b¯mµ
v
m +
m−1∑
j=i
(b¯j+1 − b¯j)µ
v
j , i ∈ [m],
B¯wi = b¯mµ
w
m +
m−1∑
j=i
(b¯j+1 − b¯j)µ
w
j , i ∈ [m].
Nested implementations of partitioned booking limits
If the various types of cargo are ranked in such a fashion that lower-indexed types are
considered to be more preferable, then partitioned booking limits naturally give rise to
nested booking limits. More precisely, given partitioned booking limits bi, i ∈ [m], we
can define b¯i =
∑m
j=i bj . Analogously, for partitioned capacity limitsBvi and Bwi , i ∈ [m],
we define B¯vi =
∑m
j=iB
v
j and B¯wi =
∑m
j=iB
w
j . In our numerical experiments we consider
nested implementations of partitioned booking limits based on the rankings of cargo types
implied by the profitability coefficients introduced in Section 3.2.1.2.
35
4.2 Simulation Setup and Parameters
Following the setup presented in Amaruchkul et al. (2007) we have set the following
parameters: cargo types, volume and weight requirements, volume and weight capacities,
revenue function, off-loading costs, number of decision periods and the demand arrival
probabilities.
In all of our computational study we assume that each cargo shipment has determin-
istic weight and random volume requirements at the time of booking. This is because it
is relatively easier for the shipper to measure the weight, however it requires more so-
phisticated tools to measure the volume. Therefore, volume is represented by a random
variable which follows a log-normal distribution.
As in Amaruchkul et al. (2007), a shipment type is defined by two components: class
and category. Class of the shipment is characterized by its content, e.g. flowers, clothes,
electronics or fresh products. Therefore, class is the primary component that determines
the rate which company will charge per chargeable unit wˆ (See Table 4.2). On the other
hand, category of the shipment is defined by its expected volume and weight (See Table
4.1). There are 24 categories and 10 classes. Consequently, the number of different cargo
types becomes m = 24× 10 = 240.
Table 4.1: Weight (kg) and Expected Volume (×104 cm3) for Category
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Weight 50 50 50 50 100 100 100 100 200 200 200 250
Mean vol. 30 29 27 25 59 58 55 52 125 119 100 147
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Weight 250 300 400 500 1000 1500 2500 3500 70 70 210 210
Mean vol. 138 179 235 277 598 898 1488 2083 233 17 700 52
Table 4.2: Revenue Function for Classes
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 < wˆ ≤ 90 1.12 1.04 0.92 0.82 0.8 0.87 0.99 0.72 0.7 0.55
90 < wˆ ≤ 990 1.11 1.03 0.91 0.81 0.79 0.86 0.98 0.71 0.69 0.54
990 < wˆ ≤ 1990 1.09 1.01 0.89 0.79 0.77 0.84 0.96 0.69 0.67 0.52
1990 < wˆ 1.08 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.95 0.68 0.66 0.51
In our numerical experiments, the revenue function ri(.) appearing in (3.2) is taken to
be a piecewise linear function as described in Table 4.2 and the inverse density constant
γ is equal to 6 m3/ton. Our models require the revenue obtained when a single booking
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request is accepted. However, because volume is taken to be a random variable, we esti-
mated this immediate contribution by using E[ri(max{w, V/γ})] instead. Please refer to
Appendix D for related calculations.
There are 60 decision periods in which at most one arrival occurs. Booking horizon
starts at t = 60 and plane leaves at t = 0. We use the time dependent arrival probabilities
presented in Amaruchkul et al. (2007) (for details, see Tables 4.3 and 4.4); each value is
associated with the probability that an arriving booking request belongs to a certain class
and category at a particular time period. The probability of observing a booking request
arrival for type-i cargo at time t, denoted by pit, is obtained by multiplying the arrival
probabilities associated with the category and the class of cargo type-i.
Table 4.3: Arrival Probabilities for Classes
Periods 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60
Class 1 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Class 2 0.006 0.007 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.02
Class 3 0.005 0.005 0.05 0.07 0.065 0.08
Class 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.045 0.045 0.07
Class 5 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.03
Class 6 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Class 7 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Class 8 0.078 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09
Class 9 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055
Class 10 0.001 0.045 0.002 0.002 0.05 0.05
Table 4.4: Arrival Probabilities for Categories
Categories 1-10 11-16 17-20 21-24
Probability 0.072 0.04 0.009 0.001
Volume and weight capacities (Cv, Cw) are determined as fractions of the expected
total demands dv =
∑T
t=1
∑m
i=1 pitµ
v
i and dw =
∑T
t=1
∑m
i=1 pitµ
w
i . Basically, given the
capacity demand ratios (Cv/dv, Cw/dw), we determine the volume and weight capacities.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 we consider two ways of modelling the off-loading costs.
In the first approach, we assume that off-loading cost functions hv and hw are defined as in
(3.1). On the other hand, the second approach calculates the off-loading cost by solving a
net revenue maximization problem which identifies the individual shipments that are to be
denied loading. In both approaches we assume that partial loadings are allowed. For the
first approach, we need to specify the off-loading cost coefficients θv and θw per unit of
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off-loaded volume and weight, respectively. To do this, we first calculate the benchmark
penalty costs (ηv, ηw) using the following equations:
T∑
t=1
m∑
i=1
pitρi = ηvdv
T∑
t=1
m∑
i=1
pitρi = ηwdw.
Then, given the penalty cost rate ratios (θv/ηv, θw/ηw), we set the values of θv and θw. In
our second approach, the cost of off-loading a type-i shipment at period t under scenario
s is taken as θvvsit + θwwsit. Remark 4 explains the motivation behind our selection.
We utilized a Monte Carlo simulation for all our models while estimating hard-to-
compute expressions. First, we used this approach to estimate the complicated expectation
terms for finding the optimal solution of (Risk TB) (see Appendix C) and we selected
the sample size as 10, 000 which gave quite stable results among different samplings.
Secondly, for our traditional randomized linear programming model we sampled 1000
demand realizations in order to estimate the dual variables. Finally, for our two stage
stochastic linear programming model, we sampled K = 25 realizations of demand and
L = 200 realizations of volume and weight.
Recall that the problem (Risk TB) requires the probability pi, i ∈ [m], that a booking
request is for type-i cargo. These probabilities are calculated by
pi =
E[Di]∑m
i=1E[Di]
=
∑T
t=1 pit∑m
i=1
∑T
t=1 pit
.
Using these multinomial probabilities, we generate the mixture random variables V¯i and
W¯i in the corresponding Monte Carlo simulation.
In order to obtain the bid-prices by solving the traditional RLP, we generate samples
of total demand for each cargo type. Thus, we need the joint distribution of D1, . . . , Dm.
Obtaining this probability distribution is not very straightforward becauseDi is the sum of
T independent Bernoulli random variables each having a different probability of success.
Under the assumption of independent total demands, we obtain the marginal distributions
of Di, i ∈ [m] by using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), see Appendix E for details. We
utilize the FFT also for the EMSRb heuristic, since it requires the distribution of
∑j
i=1Di
for all j ∈ [m]. Similarly,
∑j
i=1Di is the sum of jT independent Bernoulli random
variables. Therefore, calculations are quite similar to those for the distribution of Di.
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A single problem instance is defined by the combination of three sets of parameters.
The first is the capacity demand ratios for volume and weight (Cv/dv, Cw/dw). Second
is the coefficient of variation denoted by cv. The final parameter is the penalty cost rate
ratios (θv/ηv, θw/ηw). From this point on, we will represent a single instance using the
notation: (Cv/dv, Cw/dw, cv, θv/ηv, θw/ηw). We generated 154 different instances for
our computational experiments and we next present the details. Let us denote the set of
values we used as capacity demand ratio, coefficient of variation and penalty cost rate pa-
rameters by C1, C2, and C3 respectively. The generated instances can be divided into two
groups. The first group involves tighter capacities on at least one dimension, whereas the
second group involves more moderate capacities. There are 24 instances within the first
group and the associated parameter values are as follows: C1 = {(0.1, 1.0),(0.2, 1.0),
(0.3, 0.3),(0.3, 1.0),(0.4, 0.4), (0.4, 1)}, C2 = {0.2, 0.8}, C3 = {(1.5, 1.5), (2.0, 2.0)}.
The parameter values of the second group are: C1 = {(0.5, 0.5),(0.5, 1.0),(1.0, 0.5),
(0.75, 0.75),(0.75, 1.0), (1.0, 0.75),(0.9, 0.9), (0.9, 1.0),(1.0, 0.9), (1.0, 1.0), (1.1, 1.1),
(1.1, 1.0), (1.0, 1.1)}, C2 = {0.2, 0.8}, C3 = {(0.8, 0.8), (1.0, 1.0), (1.2, 1.2), (1.5, 1.5),
(2.0, 2.0)}. In order to estimate the expected revenue under each setting, we conducted
simulation and for each instance we ran 1000 replications. Solving RM2P takes less than
10 seconds, RMD and EMSR based heuristics take less than 1 second, RLP-1 takes less
than 1 minute on average. Solving 25 large scale linear programming models in order
to obtain bid-prices for RLP-2, took around 15 minutes on average. Please note that
given times are in terms of wall clock time all and the computational experiments were
conducted on an Intel R© CoreTM2 Quad, 2.33 GHz processor, 8 GB RAM (Windows 7,
64-bit) computer.
4.3 Benchmark Policies
We implemented three of the heuristics proposed by Amaruchkul et al. (2007), the al-
gorithm proposed by Pak and Dekker (2004) and the first come first serve policy as
benchmark policies. Amaruchkul et al. (2007)’s first heuristic develops a policy based
on two approximate DP formulations whereas the other two heuristics propose bid-price
and booking-limit policies. Pak and Dekker (2004)’s algorithm also provides bid-prices
and utilizes these bid-prices during the decision process. First come first serve policy
accepts all booking requests unless it results in exceeding the capacity.
The DP formulation of the cargo capacity control problem is presented in Amaruchkul
et al. (2007). The state space of this DP formulation is a vector (x) of size m denoting the
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number of accepted type-i cargoes. As a result, this problem becomes computationally
intractable. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Zm+ be the state vector with xi representing the
number of accepted requests for cargo type-i so far. The initial state, at the beginning of
the booking horizon is the zero m-vector, denoted by e0, and gT (e0) gives the optimal
function value where gt(x) denotes the recursive equations of the DP formulation.
gt(x) =
m∑
i=1
pitmax{ρi + gt−1(x+ ei), gt−1(x)}+ p0tgt−1(x), t = 1, . . . , T, (4.1)
g0(x) = −E

θv
[
m∑
i=1
xi∑
j=1
Vij − Cv
]
+
+ θw
[
m∑
i=1
xi∑
j=1
Wij − Cw
]
+

 , (4.2)
where Vij and Wij are the volume and weight requirements of jth accepted type-i cargo
booking and ei denotes the m-dimensional unit vector with a 1 in the ith position and 0
anywhere else. Because it is computationally challenging to solve this high-dimensional
DP problem, Amaruchkul et al. (2007) propose different approximations to the formula-
tion above. We next briefly describe one of their heuristics that we used for benchmarking.
HD Heuristic
This heuristic is based on an approximation approach which formulates two separate DP
problems (uvt , uwt ) based on volume and weight dimensions. The state space for the DP
based on volume is taken as the expected total volume accepted and for DP based on
weight, it is expected total weight accepted so far. Immediate revenue for uvt is f vi =
E
[
[ri(Vi/γ)− ri(wi)]1{Vi≥γwi}
]
and for uwt , it is fwi = E[ri(wi)]. Boundary equations
for both dimensions are equal to the related dimension’s expected off-loading costs. This
approximation is used for both providing an upper bound on the expected net revenue
value (uvT (0) + uwT (0)) and determining the decision policy of HD heuristic.
In HD heuristic, a type-i booking request arrival at time t is accepted when the states
are x =
∑m
i=1 xiµ
v
i and y =
∑m
i=1 xiµ
w
i if
ρi ≥ [u
v
t−1(x) + u
w
t−1(y)]− [u
v
t−1(x+ µ
v
i ) + u
w
t−1(y + µ
w
i )].
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Partitioned Allocations (PA) Policy
Booking limits for PA heuristic are derived by solving the problem:
ξ(E[D]) = max{φ(x) : x ≤ E[D]},
where
φ(x) =
m∑
i=1
ρixi − θv[
m∑
i=1
µvixi − Cv]+ − θw[
m∑
i=1
µwi xi − Cw]+.
Let z∗ be the optimal solution of the above optimization problem. Then, PA accepts a
type-i booking request if and only if
x+ µvi ≤ Cv, y + µ
w
i ≤ Cw, and xi < ⌈zi⌉.
Bid-Price (BP) Policy
Dual variables (λv and λw) associated with the volume and weight constraints of the
problem (KS Alloc) are used as bid-prices for the BP heuristic. Then a type-i booking
request is accepted if and only if
x+ µvi ≤ Cv, y + µ
w
i ≤ Cw, and ρi ≥ µviλv + µwi λw. (4.3)
Pak and Dekker’s Bid-Price (PD) Policy
Pak and Dekker (2004) model the booking process as a two-dimensional on-line knapsack
problem and obtain the bid-prices using the greedy algorithm proposed by Rinnooy Kan
et al. (1993) (See Appendix F). A booking request is accepted or rejected according to the
rule given (4.3), but the dual variables (λv and λw) are replaced by the bid-prices obtained
by Rinnooy Kan et al. (1993)’s algorithm. In order to make a more fair comparison with
our two stage stochastic linear programming model, we ran this algorithm for 1000 times
and took the average of the bid-prices.
First Come First Serve (FCFS) Policy
The FCFS policy accepts all the booking requests as long as the expected total volume
and weight of the already accepted bookings do not exceed the respective capacities. In
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other words, a type-i booking request is accepted if and only if
x+ µvi ≤ Cv and y + µwi ≤ Cw.
Note that FCFS policy can also be considered as a bid-price policy where the bid-prices
are equal to zero.
4.4 An Overview of Implemented Methods
In the computational study, we implemented the policies obtained by solving our models
(presented in Chapter 3) and the benchmark policies (described in the previous section)
according to the details explained in Section 4.1.2. In particular, we consider four types
of booking limit polices and three types of bid-price policies.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the proposed two-phase method sets the available capac-
ity to be equal to the total booking limit obtained by solving the problem (Risk TB) or
(Service TB). Then, it uses a particular type of profitability coefficients to obtain the
nested booking limits as summarized in Algorithm 1. We refer to this approach as RM2P.
Our model RiskD and the PA approach provide us with the partitioned booking limits.
Then, we use the proposed nested structures to convert them to the nested ones. Thus,
the nested booking limits are obtained for three models: RM2P, RiskD and PA. For each
model, we use three types of profitability coefficients to obtain the nested booking limits.
With the randomized version of the third type of profitability coefficients, we consider six
types of nested structures. For convenience, we introduce the abbreviations summarized
in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
Obtaining Bid-Price Policies
RLP-1 Traditional Randomized Linear Programming Model
RLP-2 Two Stage Stochastic Linear Programming Model
PD Pak and Dekker (2004)’s Bid-Price Policy
FCFS First Come First Serve Policy
Obtaining Booking Limit Policies
RM2P Two-Phase Risk-Based Model
RMD Risk-Based Model for Partitioned Booking Limits
PA Partitioned-Allocations Heuristic of Amaruchkul et al. (2007)
Table 4.5: Implemented Models
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Profitability coefficients
∗-1 Type 1: (3.10)
∗-2 Type 2: (3.11)
Type 3: LP used to estimate λw and λv
∗w-3 (3.12) (KS Alloc)
∗v-3 (3.13) (KS Alloc)
∗w-R3 (3.12) (Random RKS)
∗v-R3 (3.13) (Random RKS)
“
∗
”: Stands for the model RM2P, RMD or PA
Table 4.6: Implemented Nested Structures
4.5 Numerical Results and Insights
According to the numerical results presented in Amaruchkul et al. (2007), HD heuristic
outperforms their all other heuristics. Therefore, we took HD as a benchmark while eval-
uating the performance of different heuristics that we consider in our computational study.
We quantify the solution quality of different heuristics by relative percent difference with
respect to HD heuristic and it is calculated as:
100×
Z¯HD − Z¯π
Z¯HD
, (4.4)
where π represents one of the heuristics, and Z¯HD and Z¯π represent the net revenues
(averaged over all replications) of the policies obtained by HD and π, respectively.
Abbreviations in Tables (4.12) and (4.16) stand for:
Rel. Dif. Equation (4.4)
Utilization
(
100× Avg
(
Total Volume Accepted
Volume Capacity
)
, 100× Avg
(
Total Weight Accepted
Weight Capacity
))
Offloaded
(
100× Avg
(
Offloaded Volume
Total Volume Accepted
)
, 100× Avg
(
Offloaded Weight
Total Weight Accepted
))
Acc. 100× Avg
(
Number of Requests Accepted
Total Number of Requests
)
OC 100× Avg
(Offloading Cost
Total Revenue
)
.
4.5.1 Booking Limit Policies
Relative percent differences from HD heuristic of all the booking limit policies are pre-
sented in Tables (4.7)-(4.12) and Figures (4.2)-(4.3).
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Like PA heuristic of (Amaruchkul et al., 2007), RMD initially provides partitioned
booking limits. When these partitioned booking limits are directly utilized in the decision
process, mean net revenue obtained is 4% worse than the nested versions of RMD on
average. In almost all instances, using booking limits in a nested structure performed
better than using partitioned booking limits. Therefore we did not represent the results of
policies where partitioned booking limits were used. Figure (4.1) represents the average
revenue over all instances for each booking limit model and it reveals that, out of six
different nesting methods, ∗v-3 and ∗w-3 performed the worst. Therefore, results given
by these nesting methods are not presented either.
In figure (4.2), we present how total booking limit responds to the penalty cost rate
ratios under different capacity demand ratio values (i.e. each line corresponds to a differ-
ent capacity demand ratio). Selected instances in this figure, have coefficient of variation
0.2 and equal volume and weight capacity demand ratios. It is clear from the figure that
RM2P is quite sensitive to the changes in penalty cost rate ratio as total booking limit
decreases strictly with increasing penalty coefficients. This behaviour leads RM2P to per-
form more conservatively resulting in small volume and weight capacity utilizations (See
Table (4.12)). Because of unused capacity, the opportunity cost increases and the overall
performance of RM2P decreases.
Figures (4.3(a))-(4.3(n)) show that it is not possible to make strict comparisons be-
tween different models and different nesting structures. Each model and each nesting
structure have proven useful under different setups. However, in all figures, there are a
number of instances, where for a single model, different nesting structures give the same
result. This event does not necessarily imply that the orderings given by different nesting
methods are the same. This can also be due to large booking limits. So, if the non-zero
booking limits are relatively larger, those booking requests which have a non-zero book-
ing request are always accepted and remaining requests are rejected. Since the set of cargo
types which have zero booking limit were almost the same for different nesting structures,
their performances were quite close to each other. So, equal results of different nesting
methods do not imply that the ordering of cargo types are also equal.
Figures (4.3(a)) and (4.3(b)) represent the performance of all models implemented us-
ing all nesting methods when all parameters are fixed except for the capacity demand ra-
tios which are equal to each other for volume and weight. Figure (4.3(a)) show the results
under low coefficient of variation, whereas Figure (4.3(b)) represent a setting with high
coefficient of variation. These figures illustrate how variability effects the performance
of all the models. Under both settings RM2P performs poorly. PA and RMD models per-
44
formed quite similarly. The differences in solutions were resulted because of different
nesting strategies. Under low coefficient of variation when the capacity demand ratio is
low, ∗v-R3 and ∗w-R3 performed the best. However, when the capacity demand ratio is
higher, ∗-1 gave the best results. High coefficient of variation on the other hand, favoured
∗-2 and ∗w-R3 methods.
Remaining figures in this section are organized in the following way: For each pa-
rameter set, we present two figures, each comparing two different models. For instance
Figure (4.3(c)) and (4.3(d)) are plotted using the same instances, however in the first fig-
ure, we compare RM2P and RMD and in the second figure, we compare RMD and PA. This
was done to emphasize the settings where each model performs better. Because PA was
mostly outperformed by other models, we decided to make comparisons of PA separately.
This way, it became easier to identify each model’s behaviour under different settings.
We fixed all instance parameters and observed results under changing weight capacity
demand ratio in Figures (4.3(c))-(4.3(f)). Coefficient of variation of the instances were
0.2 in Figures (4.3(c)) and (4.3(d)), 0.8 in Figures (4.3(e)) and (4.3(f)). Although RMD
mostly gives the best results, RM2P performed the best among all models when the weight
capacity demand ratio is equal to 0.5 and it performed better than PA when it is equal to
0.75. First type (∗-1) of nesting gave the most satisfactory results under these instances.
Similarly in Figures (4.3(g))-(4.3(j)), we fix all parameters except for volume capacity
demand ratio. RM2P performed the best when the capacity demand ratio is lower. Under
these instances PA also performed close to RM2P and for all models type 2 (∗-2) nesting
method gave the best results.
Figures (4.3(k))-(4.3(n)) capture the effect of changing penalty cost rate ratios. Fig-
ures (4.3(k)) and (4.3(m)) directly illustrate the effect of penalty cost rate ratio on the per-
formance of RM2P. Increasing penalty rate causes RM2P to perform too conservatively.
However, when the penalty costs are decreased RM2P’s results were quite competitive to
RMD. Among different, nesting methods ∗w-R3 and ∗-1 respond to the changes in penalty
cost rate ratio the best.
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Figure 4.1: Net Revenues Averaged Over All Instances
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Table 4.7: Relative Difference (%) of Booking Limit Policies
Instance RM2P-1 RM2P-2 RMv2P-R3 RMw2P-R3 RMD-1 RMD-2 RMvD-R3 RMwD-R3 PA-1 PA-2 PAv-R3 PAw-R3 PA∗
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) -4.55 -5.91 21.48 -4.55 24.22 -2.20 24.22 24.22 30.05 -2.56 25.31 30.05 32.01
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 2.24 -2.68 25.59 2.24 21.36 -4.79 21.36 21.36 27.14 -5.18 22.42 27.14 28.99
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -11.15 -9.37 17.46 -11.15 17.56 0.59 13.87 17.56 22.12 -7.93 22.05 22.12 23.87
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -11.13 -14.40 17.38 -11.13 9.74 -4.23 5.66 9.74 15.12 -13.29 14.90 15.12 16.63
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) -5.76 -5.78 21.98 -5.76 3.44 -5.56 4.14 3.44 15.01 -3.95 15.02 15.01 18.01
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) -1.66 -4.08 25.10 -1.66 1.39 -5.64 2.22 1.39 12.90 -5.53 12.91 12.90 15.62
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -11.83 -11.62 9.86 -11.83 7.24 -11.58 3.56 7.24 7.34 -4.00 4.29 7.34 10.43
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -5.72 -4.52 19.34 -5.72 1.71 -6.08 -2.08 1.71 1.82 -6.29 -1.17 1.82 4.68
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 23.80 23.29 27.66 31.62 6.70 7.89 4.51 3.30 6.71 7.92 4.71 3.76 28.46
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 29.57 34.28 36.15 35.42 6.29 6.93 4.00 3.19 6.30 6.94 4.23 3.64 27.45
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 26.55 27.87 30.97 33.36 6.72 5.12 3.57 2.99 6.69 5.17 3.75 3.04 23.47
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 33.74 33.92 34.85 33.91 6.71 3.44 2.11 2.51 6.71 3.30 1.87 2.26 18.44
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.99 1.70 19.49 0.99 18.56 -3.79 18.40 18.56 18.54 -1.94 18.40 18.54 21.79
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 3.57 1.71 23.36 3.57 17.25 -5.33 17.08 17.25 17.21 -3.68 17.08 17.21 20.69
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -3.64 -3.82 13.05 -3.64 2.38 -2.88 0.03 2.38 12.29 -3.34 12.18 12.29 15.65
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -5.98 -6.54 12.65 -5.98 -6.52 -5.32 -1.13 -6.52 6.84 -6.38 6.72 6.84 10.48
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 23.16 22.44 23.94 27.40 6.77 4.38 4.34 6.79 6.51 7.70 5.92 8.32 26.78
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 34.90 33.37 37.82 41.46 6.40 4.31 4.13 6.32 6.05 6.92 5.36 7.56 25.62
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 19.19 18.60 20.63 22.87 6.47 2.90 3.57 4.92 4.88 3.51 3.58 5.40 22.40
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 29.69 28.91 31.43 35.74 8.66 4.62 4.60 8.71 4.72 2.72 2.22 4.94 20.03
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.74 1.19 15.60 1.74 15.57 3.17 15.39 15.57 15.59 -0.58 15.42 15.59 18.96
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 7.70 6.97 22.47 7.70 13.98 -3.06 13.92 13.98 14.28 -1.83 14.17 14.28 17.58
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -0.26 -2.23 12.10 -0.26 10.36 -3.75 10.35 10.36 10.36 -3.65 10.35 10.36 13.42
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.83 -1.26 12.79 -0.83 -2.42 -4.42 -2.72 -2.42 6.83 -4.77 6.89 6.83 9.93
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 6.67 6.69 8.63 9.67 4.68 4.71 4.64 4.91 3.30 13.81 13.25 14.92 23.06
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 11.40 11.70 12.92 13.67 4.43 3.29 3.27 3.55 3.08 15.07 14.35 16.07 23.81
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 14.12 13.51 14.45 17.88 4.16 4.37 4.11 4.54 2.77 14.61 13.76 15.52 22.88
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 20.72 21.04 24.00 26.30 2.66 13.32 13.01 14.43 2.65 13.91 13.16 14.85 22.49
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 31.88 30.27 32.00 36.10 4.18 3.57 3.46 3.72 2.46 13.63 13.01 14.45 22.45
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 6.21 6.30 7.77 8.58 5.16 4.21 5.71 7.34 4.30 6.38 9.29 9.30 21.46
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.35 9.85 10.93 11.05 4.36 3.46 5.12 6.42 3.51 5.56 9.07 9.08 20.91
∗: The policy based on the partitioned booking limits is implemented.
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Table 4.8: Relative Difference (%) of Booking Limit Policies (Continued)
Instance RM2P-1 RM2P-2 RMv2P-R3 RMw2P-R3 RMD-1 RMD-2 RMvD-R3 RMwD-R3 PA-1 PA-2 PAv-R3 PAw-R3 PA∗
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 13.12 13.38 16.00 16.58 4.04 2.87 4.61 5.63 3.13 4.41 8.03 8.03 19.17
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 16.30 16.84 19.07 21.56 3.37 2.64 7.35 7.35 3.36 3.77 7.35 7.36 18.00
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 26.18 25.74 27.57 30.15 4.36 2.75 6.11 6.11 4.33 3.71 6.11 6.11 16.95
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 13.05 13.07 17.96 13.04 12.97 12.98 12.97 12.97 12.98 12.98 12.97 12.98 14.13
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 7.40 7.29 15.33 7.42 19.69 6.29 20.19 19.69 22.01 9.07 21.94 22.01 25.52
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 6.10 5.84 15.60 6.11 15.84 2.03 16.43 15.84 18.44 4.80 18.44 18.44 22.17
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 8.54 8.60 19.69 8.58 16.82 0.40 16.80 16.82 17.24 2.11 17.22 17.24 20.75
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 14.09 11.70 25.32 14.14 14.90 -2.51 14.84 14.90 15.28 0.44 15.22 15.28 18.60
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 16.84 16.95 20.69 16.84 16.77 16.81 18.22 16.77 16.77 16.81 17.95 16.77 17.81
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.44 9.16 15.26 9.44 18.71 8.92 21.99 18.71 21.79 10.04 21.37 21.79 25.00
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 4.59 4.63 12.60 4.68 12.29 2.25 15.89 12.29 15.60 3.34 15.10 15.60 19.15
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.75 4.21 13.67 3.78 6.88 3.11 11.59 6.88 11.51 -2.10 10.80 11.51 14.90
(0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 4.55 2.02 13.91 4.63 -4.89 -6.36 -3.23 -4.89 6.08 -6.14 5.47 6.08 8.97
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 14.18 14.14 14.17 19.97 13.98 13.98 13.98 14.03 13.98 13.98 13.98 14.03 15.03
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.86 10.08 10.05 17.70 24.05 19.45 24.05 24.05 24.08 19.66 24.08 24.08 27.49
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 9.22 9.33 9.40 19.81 13.41 16.90 13.41 15.36 21.72 17.10 21.72 21.72 25.11
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 11.39 12.63 11.92 25.52 12.98 16.85 12.98 15.22 21.57 17.00 21.57 21.57 24.65
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 17.64 17.40 18.40 29.35 12.64 16.23 12.64 14.81 20.66 16.38 20.66 20.67 23.80
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 10.42 10.39 10.41 16.05 10.37 10.21 10.37 10.37 10.37 10.21 10.37 10.37 11.34
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 6.17 5.99 6.27 13.43 16.25 16.29 16.25 17.44 20.39 16.89 20.39 19.36 23.89
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 5.86 6.07 5.88 14.46 14.43 14.22 14.43 15.64 18.63 14.75 18.63 17.66 22.17
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 10.73 11.35 10.78 22.37 15.59 15.43 15.59 16.67 19.84 15.88 19.84 18.84 22.95
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 20.60 21.64 20.35 30.36 14.95 14.67 14.95 15.73 17.99 14.99 17.99 16.93 21.23
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.69 3.77 4.00 4.01 2.94 7.30 7.47 5.42 2.94 8.38 8.54 7.39 12.02
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 6.58 6.42 9.21 9.34 2.73 7.87 7.33 8.21 2.81 8.76 8.83 7.90 12.42
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 8.77 9.68 10.68 12.30 2.17 8.58 8.31 7.70 2.27 8.31 8.35 7.47 12.08
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 17.13 18.62 19.24 19.57 1.48 7.94 7.71 6.81 1.54 7.71 7.82 6.62 11.86
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 23.83 23.20 24.10 25.09 1.58 8.08 7.59 6.88 1.68 7.59 7.66 6.42 11.47
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.22 3.34 3.52 3.46 2.88 4.13 3.66 2.96 2.84 7.65 5.52 3.22 11.20
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.65 3.50 4.30 4.68 2.27 5.89 3.33 2.26 2.27 7.12 4.82 2.51 10.61
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 6.50 7.95 8.64 9.07 1.61 6.08 4.11 1.83 1.65 6.83 4.36 2.33 10.40
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Table 4.9: Relative Difference (%) of Booking Limit Policies (Continued)
Instance RM2P-1 RM2P-2 RMv2P-R3 RMw2P-R3 RMD-1 RMD-2 RMvD-R3 RMwD-R3 PA-1 PA-2 PAv-R3 PAw-R3 PA∗
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 14.00 15.59 16.38 16.89 1.65 2.55 1.71 1.08 1.66 5.39 3.53 1.63 9.11
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 21.02 20.14 21.21 21.39 2.09 1.19 1.08 1.08 2.11 4.69 2.53 1.54 8.19
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 6.76 6.79 7.50 6.76 7.46 7.36 7.39 7.46 7.50 7.36 7.39 7.50 10.76
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 5.66 5.46 6.58 5.64 5.72 4.99 8.01 10.18 6.18 5.00 8.10 10.17 13.69
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 5.63 5.51 10.51 5.63 4.90 4.11 7.08 8.10 5.35 4.12 7.60 9.51 12.82
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 9.68 9.94 15.24 9.69 3.78 2.94 6.22 7.37 4.27 2.95 6.68 8.74 12.29
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 17.36 18.34 19.92 17.33 2.29 1.56 4.45 5.62 2.79 1.54 4.92 6.93 10.83
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 7.74 7.76 8.12 7.74 7.91 7.96 7.93 8.05 7.93 7.96 7.93 8.05 11.08
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 5.49 5.36 5.98 5.52 4.99 4.96 7.09 8.37 5.45 4.96 7.13 9.17 12.53
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 4.42 4.27 8.36 4.45 2.98 3.04 5.47 4.47 3.41 3.04 5.55 7.43 10.60
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 6.37 6.42 11.48 6.40 2.38 0.78 3.37 2.38 1.57 1.00 3.56 5.43 8.82
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 11.71 12.49 14.57 11.77 -1.55 -1.36 -0.53 -0.46 -1.08 -1.38 -0.45 1.01 4.56
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 5.56 5.50 5.55 6.34 6.20 6.19 6.53 6.19 6.20 6.19 6.53 6.19 9.81
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 5.14 5.44 5.27 7.82 5.11 7.20 11.54 8.15 6.74 7.69 12.04 8.85 15.56
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 6.07 6.07 6.24 10.98 4.49 7.40 11.20 8.36 6.07 7.31 11.06 8.28 14.49
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 8.80 10.75 9.23 16.26 3.62 6.08 9.02 6.66 5.20 6.30 9.74 7.17 13.41
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 15.96 19.72 17.07 21.31 2.75 5.58 8.91 6.27 4.32 6.02 9.91 7.04 13.70
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.16 3.12 3.17 3.81 3.46 3.64 4.20 3.65 3.48 3.64 4.24 3.65 7.75
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.64 2.55 2.75 4.07 2.28 4.99 9.22 5.17 4.35 5.00 9.22 5.18 12.72
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.43 3.27 3.52 8.00 1.74 4.37 8.37 4.54 3.63 4.37 8.36 4.55 11.94
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 5.95 7.60 6.20 12.58 1.21 3.77 7.50 3.95 2.91 3.78 7.50 3.96 11.43
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 16.14 18.03 16.09 20.44 0.81 3.37 8.40 3.52 2.66 3.40 8.40 3.55 12.31
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.64 2.58 2.71 2.63 2.37 3.60 3.60 3.60 2.47 3.58 3.58 3.60 7.23
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.92 3.91 4.51 4.44 2.46 3.69 3.69 3.69 2.54 3.92 3.92 3.69 7.31
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 4.37 4.40 4.94 4.75 2.16 3.31 3.31 3.31 2.22 3.72 3.72 3.31 7.11
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 10.39 11.38 12.91 12.73 1.70 2.99 2.99 2.99 1.71 3.19 3.19 2.99 6.97
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 15.53 17.77 18.97 18.91 1.11 2.42 2.42 2.42 1.13 2.49 2.49 2.42 6.26
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.56 2.49 2.61 2.47 2.39 3.30 3.26 3.07 2.42 3.37 3.32 3.07 6.73
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.77 2.79 3.50 3.42 1.68 2.65 2.59 2.33 1.71 2.71 2.60 2.34 6.21
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.19 3.26 3.63 3.59 1.66 2.16 2.13 1.97 1.70 2.31 2.15 2.01 5.60
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 6.99 8.28 9.12 9.18 0.41 1.26 1.24 1.04 0.43 1.26 1.14 1.09 4.88
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Table 4.10: Relative Difference (%) of Booking Limit Policies (Continued)
Instance RM2P-1 RM2P-2 RMv2P-R3 RMw2P-R3 RMD-1 RMD-2 RMvD-R3 RMwD-R3 PA-1 PA-2 PAv-R3 PAw-R3 PA∗
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 14.45 16.26 16.09 16.41 0.11 1.26 1.21 0.93 0.10 -0.29 0.15 0.93 3.36
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.98 3.98 4.05 3.98 4.80 5.36 5.36 5.49 4.80 5.36 5.36 5.54 8.83
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.84 3.78 4.67 3.82 4.26 4.63 4.63 4.60 4.27 4.63 4.63 4.81 8.31
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 5.18 4.96 6.61 5.18 3.58 4.25 4.25 3.87 3.64 4.25 4.25 4.32 7.75
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 7.92 8.15 11.96 8.31 3.44 4.12 4.12 3.69 3.50 4.12 4.12 4.09 7.69
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 14.63 13.65 18.61 15.30 2.71 3.19 3.19 3.11 2.72 3.19 3.19 3.20 6.85
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 4.02 4.02 4.11 4.02 3.98 4.99 4.99 5.13 4.10 4.99 4.99 5.14 8.43
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.02 2.90 3.45 2.98 2.46 3.31 3.33 3.52 2.66 3.31 3.33 3.69 7.24
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.77 2.66 3.73 2.89 1.60 2.54 2.56 2.62 1.74 2.54 2.56 2.74 6.17
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.81 3.65 5.92 3.80 1.36 1.87 1.88 1.86 1.43 1.87 1.88 2.13 5.31
(0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 13.79 12.26 16.87 14.13 -0.25 0.51 0.46 -0.21 -0.26 0.51 0.46 -0.17 3.46
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.07 3.04 3.09 3.09 3.82 4.26 4.65 4.25 3.89 4.26 4.63 4.25 7.86
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.44 3.39 3.48 4.59 3.68 4.20 4.56 4.20 3.73 4.20 4.86 4.20 8.45
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 4.19 4.33 4.32 5.34 3.23 4.00 4.24 3.99 3.39 4.00 4.52 3.99 8.09
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 7.76 8.02 8.23 12.68 3.34 3.87 3.98 3.87 3.43 3.87 4.24 3.87 7.97
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 11.64 14.18 12.71 19.01 2.43 3.15 3.46 3.15 2.58 3.15 3.71 3.15 7.32
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.48 2.44 2.48 2.48 2.40 3.50 4.10 3.50 2.49 3.50 4.15 3.50 7.37
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.05 1.98 2.09 2.84 1.48 2.70 3.79 2.70 1.55 2.70 3.97 2.70 7.66
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.45 2.39 2.66 3.41 1.02 2.31 3.35 2.31 1.08 2.31 3.50 2.31 7.16
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.78 3.48 3.77 6.45 0.69 1.61 2.64 1.61 0.76 1.61 2.82 1.61 6.37
(1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 12.90 13.72 12.42 17.81 -0.29 0.45 0.91 0.45 -0.30 0.45 1.79 0.45 5.57
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.36 2.36 2.37 2.36 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 5.85
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.34 2.29 2.40 2.33 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 5.69
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.63 3.82 4.40 4.21 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 5.08
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 5.66 5.57 6.40 6.04 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 4.97
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 10.94 11.91 12.30 13.51 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 4.87
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.24 2.24 2.25 2.23 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 5.61
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.73 1.63 1.84 1.66 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 4.97
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.32 2.35 3.06 3.00 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 4.22
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.91 2.94 3.31 3.22 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 4.22
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 7.30 9.20 10.07 9.85 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.37
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Table 4.11: Relative Difference (%) of Booking Limit Policies (Continued)
Instance RM2P-1 RM2P-2 RMv2P-R3 RMw2P-R3 RMD-1 RMD-2 RMvD-R3 RMwD-R3 PA-1 PA-2 PAv-R3 PAw-R3 PA∗
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.62 2.61 2.63 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.61 5.94
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.15 2.11 2.15 2.12 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 5.52
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.23 2.19 2.28 2.20 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 5.49
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.61 3.94 4.33 3.84 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 4.86
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 5.61 5.48 6.73 5.92 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 4.56
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.21 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 5.60
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.78 1.76 1.87 1.77 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 5.17
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.45 1.39 1.52 1.37 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 4.80
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.64 1.77 2.40 1.92 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 3.69
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 2.99 3.03 4.12 3.55 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 3.21
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.37 3.36 3.37 3.37 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 6.79
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.00 2.95 3.02 3.06 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 6.17
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.01 2.97 3.07 4.35 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 5.94
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 5.21 5.14 5.31 5.95 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 5.64
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 7.99 8.03 8.69 12.84 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 5.63
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.36 2.35 2.36 2.36 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 5.79
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.07 2.02 2.10 2.06 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 5.27
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.55 1.47 1.63 2.66 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 4.47
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.28 3.07 3.27 3.75 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 4.28
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 6.04 5.70 6.29 10.40 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 3.80
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 4.24 4.24 4.26 4.25 4.22 4.22 4.22 4.22 4.22 4.22 4.22 4.22 7.57
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.43 3.46 3.57 3.45 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 6.63
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.13 3.03 4.22 3.13 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 6.06
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 4.97 4.75 5.90 5.01 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 5.53
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 7.74 7.56 12.47 8.21 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 5.22
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 4.15 4.15 4.17 4.15 4.12 4.12 4.12 4.12 4.12 4.12 4.12 4.12 7.47
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.18 3.19 3.34 3.17 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 6.26
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.35 2.18 3.22 2.33 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 5.19
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.45 2.25 3.20 2.51 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 4.14
(1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 5.09 4.85 9.42 5.44 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3.56
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Table 4.12: Some Performance Measures of Booking Limit Policies
RM2P-2 RMD-2 PA-2
Instance Rel. Diff. Utilization Offloaded Acc OC Rel. Diff. Utilization Offloaded Acc OC Rel. Diff. Utilization Offloaded Acc OC
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 11.70 (79.72 , 80.30) (0.65 , 0.00) 59.16 5.65 3.29 (93.29 , 94.53) (1.03 , 0.00) 70.52 1.04 17.75 (74.74 , 75.20) (0.59 , 0.00) 54.05 4.45
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 21.04 (68.4 , 68.64) (0.36 , 0.00) 48.83 2.60 13.32 (75.72 , 75.97) (0.54 , 0.00) 55.35 0.77 16.15 (75.07 , 75.32) (0.53 , 0.00) 54.30 4.60
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 30.27 (58.17 , 58.51) (0.18 , 0.00) 40.07 1.40 3.57 (90.82 , 92.10) (0.78 , 0.00) 68.03 1.59 15.79 (74.35 , 74.98) (0.37 , 0.00) 54.34 3.70
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.85 (80.33 , 80.31) (3.66 , 0.00) 59.14 10.35 3.46 (91.48 , 92.46) (5.10 , 0.00) 68.15 5.59 5.89 (86.00 , 86.02) (4.43 , 0.00) 63.15 12.70
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 16.84 (69.26 , 68.58) (2.22 , 0.00) 48.75 6.75 2.64 (88.18 , 88.04) (4.64 , 0.00) 65.79 7.32 3.91 (85.61 , 85.54) (4.23 , 0.00) 63.33 13.35
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 25.74 (56.49 , 57.50) (1.14 , 0.00) 40.26 3.55 2.75 (86.73 , 87.79) (4.16 , 0.00) 65.66 8.76 3.85 (84.03 , 85.29) (3.76 , 0.00) 62.92 11.95
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 10.08 (45.88 , 92.21) (0.00 , 0.00) 68.02 0.00 19.45 (38.29 , 76.70) (0.00 , 0.00) 51.97 0.00 24.48 (38.16 , 76.43) (0.00 , 0.00) 51.88 0.00
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 12.63 (40.36 , 81.07) (0.00 , 0.00) 58.81 0.00 16.85 (37.33 , 74.86) (0.00 , 0.00) 52.61 0.00 20.47 (37.22 , 74.64) (0.00 , 0.00) 52.57 0.00
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 17.4 (37.51 , 74.95) (0.00 , 0.00) 52.47 0.00 16.23 (37.58 , 74.92) (0.00 , 0.00) 52.68 0.00 19.58 (37.50 , 74.71) (0.00 , 0.00) 52.63 0.00
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 5.99 (46.43 , 92.62) (0.05 , 0.00) 67.41 0.20 16.29 (38.40 , 76.63) (0.13 , 0.00) 51.93 0.15 20.32 (38.08 , 75.98) (0.13 , 0.00) 51.41 0.35
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 11.35 (40.53 , 80.74) (0.14 , 0.00) 58.90 0.35 15.43 (37.60 , 74.84) (0.13 , 0.00) 52.65 0.23 18.88 (37.37 , 74.24) (0.13 , 0.00) 52.03 0.35
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 21.64 (35.02 , 69.02) (0.19 , 0.00) 48.57 0.45 14.67 (38.08 , 75.07) (0.19 , 0.00) 52.92 0.44 17.64 (37.97 , 74.54) (0.19 , 0.00) 52.36 0.45
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 6.42 (82.50 , 83.00) (0.83 , 0.00) 78.63 7.45 7.87 (79.27 , 79.87) (0.84 , 0.00) 77.73 0.84 9.60 (78.15 , 78.66) (0.79 , 0.00) 75.14 6.55
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 18.62 (65.94 , 66.20) (0.50 , 0.00) 64.72 3.60 7.94 (77.00 , 77.32) (0.72 , 0.00) 74.98 1.06 8.36 (77.37 , 77.63) (0.74 , 0.00) 74.86 5.95
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 23.20 (61.37 , 61.22) (0.67 , 0.00) 56.90 3.20 8.08 (76.62 , 76.93) (0.82 , 0.00) 75.06 1.62 8.22 (77.22 , 77.47) (0.83 , 0.00) 75.05 5.35
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.50 (84.79 , 85.09) (4.09 , 0.00) 80.33 12.10 5.89 (80.16 , 80.31) (3.57 , 0.00) 78.34 3.88 7.67 (78.28 , 78.62) (3.36 , 0.00) 74.85 10.05
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 15.59 (66.03 , 66.08) (2.15 , 0.00) 64.86 5.75 2.55 (83.36 , 83.36) (3.87 , 0.00) 79.28 6.65 5.69 (77.31 , 77.22) (3.09 , 0.00) 74.91 9.10
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 20.14 (62.49 , 61.22) (2.44 , 0.00) 57.00 5.10 1.19 (85.82 , 85.22) (4.21 , 0.00) 82.39 9.61 4.92 (77.49 , 76.83) (3.25 , 0.00) 74.99 8.15
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.29 (78.05 , 78.63) (1.03 , 0.00) 91.47 6.20 2.04 (78.24 , 78.81) (1.03 , 0.00) 91.75 1.13 2.08 (78.24 , 78.81) (1.03 , 0.00) 91.75 6.20
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 5.57 (74.49 , 74.75) (0.86 , 0.00) 83.52 5.70 1.54 (79.77 , 80.15) (0.95 , 0.00) 91.68 1.54 1.57 (79.77 , 80.15) (0.95 , 0.00) 91.68 6.65
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 11.91 (67.08 , 67.07) (0.75 , 0.00) 78.62 4.65 1.29 (79.20 , 79.40) (0.97 , 0.00) 92.09 2.06 1.31 (79.20 , 79.40) (0.97 , 0.00) 92.09 6.90
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.63 (77.84 , 78.64) (3.41 , 0.00) 91.46 8.15 1.43 (77.99 , 78.81) (3.43 , 0.00) 91.75 4.16 1.45 (77.99 , 78.81) (3.43 , 0.00) 91.75 8.25
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.94 (75.86 , 75.40) (3.37 , 0.00) 85.73 8.95 1.02 (80.53 , 80.01) (3.84 , 0.00) 91.63 6.89 1.03 (80.53 , 80.01) (3.84 , 0.00) 91.63 10.05
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 9.20 (67.63 , 66.67) (2.60 , 0.00) 78.86 6.00 0.01 (79.52 , 79.40) (3.64 , 0.00) 92.09 8.53 0.01 (79.52 , 79.40) (3.64 , 0.00) 92.09 9.90
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4.5.2 Bid-Price Policies
Relative percent difference of the bid-price policies from HD heuristic are presented in
Tables (4.13)-(4.16). Figure (4.4) present the relative percent differences of each bid-price
policy from HD heuristic under selected instances. For each instance we generated 1000
realizations of our random parameters and evaluated net revenue of each policy under
these individual realizations. In Figure (4.5), under four selected instances, we plot the
histogram of realized differences in net revenues given by RLP-1 and BP. Similarly, in
Figure (4.6), we plot the differences between RLP-2 and PD under the same instances.
Table (4.15) reveals that when the capacity demand ratio gets larger than 1 on either
dimensions, all bid-price policies except for PD perform the same as FCFS (Also see
figure (4.5(d))). This is because capacity constraints of RLP-1, RLP-2 and BP models
gets looser leading to smaller bid-prices. Consequently, all incoming booking requests
are accepted unless they violate the capacity constraints. PD on the other hand, gives
larger bid-prices and therefore rejects some of the incoming requests.
In all instances with capacity demand ratio smaller than 1 on at least one of the di-
mensions, BP was outperformed by all other bid-price policies (See Figures (4.4)).
Although accepting more requests causes higher off-loading costs on average, because
bid-price policies accept booking requests with marginal return larger than a threshold
value, they mostly compensate the off-loading costs in our computational studies. The re-
sults showed that accepting requests so that a certain amount of offloading is allowed gave
better net revenue values. This might be because the offloading costs are not high enough.
Utilization, relative difference and offloading cost percentage columns of Table (4.16)
also reveal that prioritizing the utilization of volume and weight capacities increases the
overall performance under our parameters.
PD’s bid-prices are more robust among different instances whereas bid-prices given
by RLP-1 and RLP-2 are more responsive to the capacity-demand ratio. Unlike RLP-2,
RLP-1 and PD do not incorporate the off-loading cost to their models, therefore bid-prices
given by RLP-2 are also affected by the penalty cost rate ratios. Under some instances,
this might result in conservative bid-prices causing RLP-2 policy to accept less. Average
net revenue over all instances with penalty cost rate ratio greater than or equal to 1.5
was largest for RLP-2. Under instances with higher coefficient of variation, the best
average net revenue is given by RLP-2. So, when there exists high penalty costs and high
variability, RLP-2 performs satisfactorily.
RLP-2 mostly outperforms other policies however under some instances it’s solution
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Figure 4.2: Total Booking Limits Obtained by RM2P
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Figure 4.3: Relative Difference of Booking Limit Policies
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quality decreases. When the capacity demand ratio is equal to 1 for volume and 0.5 or
0.75 for weight, RLP-1 mostly performs better than RLP-2. Our experimental results
revealed that under those instances, bid-prices given by RLP-1 were smaller. PD on the
other hand, outperforms all other bid-price policies when the capacity demand ratio is
smaller than or equal to 0.3 on at least one of the dimensions (See Figure (4.4(a)) for an
example). Although in terms of average net revenue RLP-2 is outperformed under these
instances, Figure (4.5(d)) shows that out of 1000 replications, there are a large number of
realizations where RLP-2 performs better than PD.
Bid-price policies performed better than the booking limit policies. This is caused by
the fact that booking limit policies set a number limit on how many booking requests to
accept from a certain class. However, arriving booking requests have different volume and
weight values. Therefore, it is less logical to ignore the volume and weight requirements
and accept booking requests solely based on a booking limit. Bid-price policies on the
other hand, propose a more logical way to allocate capacity among different booking
requests.
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Table 4.13: Relative Difference (%) of Bid-Price Policies
Instance RLP-1 RLP-2 BP PD FCFS Instance RLP-1 RLP-2 BP PD FCFS
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 9.76 -9.49 30.05 -6.35 3.30 (0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 9.31 8.38 17.90 5.96 5.35
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 7.22 -12.78 27.14 -9.24 0.86 (0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.08 2.64 17.68 5.33 4.46
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 8.32 -13.52 21.80 -10.29 4.88 (0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 8.03 2.54 16.17 4.27 4.15
(0.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.19 -17.41 14.73 -18.24 1.40 (0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 7.36 2.36 14.90 3.72 4.31
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.40 -7.04 15.00 -8.89 1.40 (0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 6.12 2.82 13.54 3.22 6.00
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.22 -9.69 12.89 -11.07 0.10 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 15.72 12.77 26.71 13.09 14.12
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -6.14 -13.82 7.24 -13.55 1.49 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.53 11.22 21.99 6.49 7.35
(0.20 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -10.79 -15.30 1.71 -17.17 -1.51 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 5.30 5.07 18.41 2.47 3.47
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 12.72 7.39 25.49 4.96 9.60 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.18 -0.99 17.23 -0.47 0.53
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 11.64 10.09 24.36 4.47 9.12 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.27 -2.55 15.27 -2.14 -0.84
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 10.11 2.37 20.32 3.47 10.25 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 18.64 17.98 28.08 16.86 18.26
(0.30 , 0.30 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 6.79 2.28 15.43 1.50 10.57 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 10.82 8.47 21.77 8.90 10.25
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.01 -3.49 20.42 -5.23 1.09 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.97 2.08 15.59 2.69 4.01
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.54 -5.69 19.29 -7.42 -0.25 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -1.25 -3.10 11.50 -2.65 -0.89
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -0.92 -7.76 13.82 -8.66 0.62 (0.50 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -6.32 -6.25 6.08 -7.44 -4.32
(0.30 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -7.29 -9.71 8.80 -13.45 -1.15 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 19.73 17.03 27.30 18.56 15.22
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 9.86 4.55 23.29 5.55 6.79 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 15.46 9.04 24.05 14.02 10.05
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 8.97 3.55 22.37 5.17 6.42 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 12.51 6.80 21.69 11.11 7.32
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 8.07 2.30 18.75 3.60 8.41 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 12.11 17.85 21.56 10.52 5.24
(0.40 , 0.40 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 6.82 2.52 16.84 2.31 8.69 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 11.77 18.89 20.71 10.13 4.74
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.10 -1.85 15.51 -0.49 0.62 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 15.05 17.58 23.19 14.50 11.37
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.72 -3.14 14.22 -1.85 -0.29 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 10.77 11.02 20.38 9.82 6.26
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) -3.35 -4.23 10.36 -4.28 -1.17 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 8.22 2.60 18.63 7.31 4.08
(0.40 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -6.57 -4.36 6.83 -6.73 -1.31 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 9.20 9.20 19.81 8.24 4.08
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 10.04 3.62 19.42 6.96 4.72 (1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 8.78 5.96 17.92 7.86 4.20
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 11.01 2.87 20.51 7.43 4.43 (0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.94 2.94 8.37 3.44 2.94
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 10.87 8.87 19.72 7.06 4.18 (0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.73 2.73 8.76 3.25 2.73
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 10.34 3.10 19.40 6.78 4.17 (0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.17 1.97 8.31 2.80 2.17
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 9.81 8.62 19.01 6.36 4.19 (0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.48 1.41 7.71 2.22 1.48
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Table 4.14: Relative Difference (%) of Bid-Price Policies (Continued)
Instance RLP-1 RLP-2 BP PD FCFS Instance RLP-1 RLP-2 BP PD FCFS
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.58 1.78 7.59 2.27 1.58 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.70 1.70 3.65 2.99 1.70
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.88 2.88 7.62 2.95 2.88 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.11 1.11 2.98 2.42 1.11
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.25 2.25 7.06 2.22 2.25 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.39 2.39 3.84 3.31 2.39
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.61 1.59 6.77 1.83 1.61 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.68 1.68 2.92 2.65 1.68
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.65 1.66 5.30 1.09 1.65 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.66 1.66 2.58 2.17 1.66
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 2.09 2.10 4.62 1.09 2.09 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.41 0.41 1.75 1.26 0.41
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 6.68 6.68 12.90 7.38 6.68 (0.90 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.11 0.11 0.05 1.26 0.11
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 4.62 4.62 10.04 5.11 4.62 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.95 3.95 5.49 5.18 3.95
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.47 3.47 9.41 3.97 3.47 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.31 3.31 4.75 4.52 3.31
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.24 2.24 8.58 2.93 2.24 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.70 2.70 4.28 3.85 2.70
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.94 0.94 6.77 1.56 0.94 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.49 2.49 4.04 3.73 2.49
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 7.68 7.68 12.83 7.97 7.66 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.69 1.69 3.15 3.14 1.69
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 5.08 5.08 9.05 4.96 5.06 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.99 3.99 5.13 4.99 3.99
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.15 2.73 7.33 3.04 3.14 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.44 2.44 3.63 3.31 2.44
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.75 0.75 5.30 1.00 0.79 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.58 1.58 2.70 2.55 1.58
(0.75 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.16 -0.16 0.87 -1.36 -0.18 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.35 1.35 2.09 1.88 1.35
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 5.40 6.19 13.31 6.23 5.39 (0.90 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 0.51 -0.21
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 4.45 4.52 12.18 5.08 4.46 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.00 3.00 5.41 4.25 3.00
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 3.84 3.84 11.24 4.41 3.84 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.87 2.87 5.62 4.24 2.87
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.78 2.78 10.03 3.59 2.78 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.60 2.60 5.09 3.99 2.60
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.71 2.72 10.09 2.72 1.71 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.45 2.45 4.67 3.72 2.45
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.96 2.96 10.66 3.64 2.95 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.56 1.56 4.10 3.12 1.56
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.96 1.97 9.18 2.37 1.97 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.40 2.40 4.77 3.50 2.40
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.58 1.58 8.33 1.81 1.58 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.49 1.49 3.97 2.70 1.49
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.68 0.68 7.45 1.22 0.68 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.01 1.01 3.50 2.31 1.01
(1.00 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.59 0.58 8.31 0.90 0.58 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.68 0.68 2.82 1.61 0.68
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.37 2.37 4.36 3.60 2.37 (1.00 , 0.90 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.29 -0.29 1.79 0.45 -0.29
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.46 2.46 4.55 3.69 2.46 (1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 4.22 4.22 4.22 5.82 4.22
(0.90 , 0.90 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.16 2.16 4.25 3.31 2.16 (1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.32 3.32 3.32 5.01 3.32
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Table 4.15: Relative Difference (%) of Bid-Price Policies (Continued)
Instance RLP-1 RLP-2 BP PD FCFS Instance RLP-1 RLP-2 BP PD FCFS
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.51 2.51 2.51 4.31 2.51 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.05 2.05 2.05 3.82 2.05
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.98 1.98 1.98 3.58 1.98 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.89 1.89 1.89 3.66 1.89
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.59 1.59 1.59 3.05 1.59 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.37 1.37 1.37 3.21 1.37
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 4.12 4.12 4.12 5.40 4.12 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.90 0.90 0.90 2.72 0.90
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 3.06 3.06 3.06 4.46 3.06 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.20 2.20 2.20 4.08 2.20
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.70 1.70 1.70 3.18 1.70 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.71 1.71 1.71 3.39 1.71
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.79 0.79 0.79 2.07 0.79 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.12 1.12 1.12 2.74 1.12
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.33 0.25 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.38 0.17
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.31 2.31 2.31 3.99 2.31 (1.10 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 0.91 -0.18
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.04 2.04 2.04 3.92 2.04 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 3.33 3.33 3.33 4.94 3.33
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 1.54 1.54 1.54 3.39 1.54 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.81 2.81 2.81 4.53 2.81
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.54 1.54 1.54 2.99 1.54 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.20 , 1.20) 2.36 2.36 2.36 4.33 2.36
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.29 1.29 1.29 2.78 1.29 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.94 1.94 1.94 3.80 1.94
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.19 2.19 2.19 3.53 2.19 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.89 1.89 1.89 3.50 1.89
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.43 1.43 1.43 3.12 1.43 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.33 2.33 2.33 3.92 2.33
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 0.76 0.76 0.76 2.18 0.76 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.89 1.89 1.89 3.54 1.89
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.77 1.02 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.20 , 1.20) 0.91 0.91 0.91 2.70 0.91
(1.10 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.39 0.01 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.92 0.83
(1.10 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 0.80 , 0.80) 2.61 2.61 2.61 4.71 2.61 (1.00 , 1.10 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.31 0.31 0.31 1.62 0.31
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Table 4.16: Some Performance Measures of Bid-Price Policies
RLP-2 PD
Instance Rel. Diff. Utilization Offloaded Acc OC Rel. Diff. Utilization Offloaded Acc OC
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.87 (93.12 , 94.40) (1.01 , 0.00) 71.49 1.02 7.43 (84.32 , 85.07) (0.79 , 0.00) 65.57 0.76
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 3.10 (89.97 , 91.46) (0.76 , 0.00) 69.92 1.14 6.78 (84.02 , 84.54) (0.64 , 0.00) 65.65 0.93
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 8.62 (80.02 , 81.88) (0.43 , 0.00) 60.39 0.81 6.36 (83.56 , 84.49) (0.51 , 0.00) 65.39 0.97
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.64 (93.89 , 94.84) (5.47 , 0.00) 71.36 6.04 5.33 (86.24 , 85.92) (4.46 , 0.00) 63.40 4.72
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 2.36 (93.75 , 94.37) (5.62 , 0.00) 71.60 9.27 3.72 (86.08 , 85.52) (4.35 , 0.00) 63.57 6.86
(0.50 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 2.82 (92.35 , 94.72) (5.10 , 0.00) 71.08 11.28 3.22 (83.89 , 85.25) (3.67 , 0.00) 63.4 7.65
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 9.04 (46.98 , 94.29) (0.00 , 0.00) 67.95 0.00 14.02 (41.83 , 83.76) (0.00 , 0.00) 59.15 0.00
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 17.85 (36.93 , 73.60) (0.00 , 0.00) 50.82 0.00 10.52 (41.21 , 82.75) (0.00 , 0.00) 60.03 0.00
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 18.89 (36.22 , 71.68) (0.00 , 0.00) 49.43 0.00 10.13 (41.32 , 82.42) (0.00 , 0.00) 59.84 0.00
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 11.02 (41.78 , 82.98) (0.17 , 0.00) 56.72 0.20 9.82 (42.65 , 84.48) (0.17 , 0.00) 60.11 0.20
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 9.20 (41.38 , 82.29) (0.15 , 0.00) 58.73 0.26 8.24 (41.96 , 83.52) (0.15 , 0.00) 61.00 0.26
(1.00 , 0.50 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 5.96 (43.56 , 85.56) (0.21 , 0.00) 62.12 0.49 7.86 (42.26 , 83.09) (0.20 , 0.00) 61.10 0.47
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.73 (88.44 , 89.18) (1.07 , 0.00) 86.34 1.15 3.25 (85.58 , 86.26) (0.94 , 0.00) 82.38 0.98
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.41 (88.24 , 88.64) (1.22 , 0.00) 86.45 1.96 2.22 (85.25 , 85.59) (1.09 , 0.00) 82.57 1.70
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.78 (86.03 , 86.62) (1.13 , 0.00) 85.09 2.35 2.27 (84.99 , 85.40) (1.12 , 0.00) 82.61 2.33
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.25 (89.24 , 89.44) (4.78 , 0.00) 85.88 5.56 2.22 (86.16 , 86.47) (4.32 , 0.00) 82.09 4.86
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.66 (89.12 , 88.67) (4.77 , 0.00) 86.30 8.50 1.09 (85.55 , 85.58) (4.15 , 0.00) 82.56 7.12
(0.75 , 0.75 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 2.10 (89.61 , 88.50) (4.79 , 0.00) 86.33 11.33 1.09 (85.94 , 85.39) (4.22 , 0.00) 82.6 9.62
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.00 , 1.00) 2.04 (78.24 , 78.81) (1.03 , 0.00) 91.75 1.13 3.92 (74.75 , 75.23) (0.95 , 0.00) 87.05 1.02
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.54 (79.77 , 80.15) (0.95 , 0.00) 91.68 1.54 2.99 (76.53 , 76.78) (0.90 , 0.00) 86.45 1.42
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.20 , 2.00 , 2.00) 1.29 (79.20 , 79.40) (0.97 , 0.00) 92.09 2.06 2.78 (76.29 , 76.28) (0.99 , 0.00) 86.83 2.04
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.00 , 1.00) 1.43 (77.99 , 78.81) (3.43 , 0.00) 91.75 4.16 3.12 (74.64 , 75.22) (3.17 , 0.00) 87.04 3.78
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 1.50 , 1.50) 1.02 (80.53 , 80.01) (3.84 , 0.00) 91.63 6.89 1.77 (76.81 , 76.43) (3.46 , 0.00) 86.61 5.98
(1.00 , 1.00 , 0.80 , 2.00 , 2.00) 0.01 (79.52 , 79.40) (3.64 , 0.00) 92.09 8.53 1.39 (76.98 , 76.28) (3.55 , 0.00) 86.83 8.17
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Figure 4.4: Relative Difference of Bid-Price Policies
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Figure 4.5: Difference between RLP-1 and BP
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Figure 4.6: Difference between RLP-2 and PD
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
We have introduced new optimization models to develop open-loop booking limit and
bid-price policies for air-cargo capacity control on a single-leg flight. While our expo-
sition is presented in a setting which does not explicitly consider no-shows, they can be
naturally incorporated into our models by allowing shipments to have zero capacity re-
quirements. Our methods can therefore be useful in developing overbooking policies. We
have conducted a comprehensive computational study to evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed models, and have illustrated that they are computationally tractable, and yield
policies that perform well compared to the benchmarks established by various methods in
the literature.
One of our main aims was to adapt existing methods from the extensive passenger
literature to the relatively little-studied cargo case. Passenger booking methods often rely
on a complete ranking of fare classes, which can be used to establish a nested structure.
We therefore developed various novel methods to rank different types of cargo. To the
best of our knowledge, these are the first rankings of this type in the cargo revenue man-
agement literature. However, in certain cases (in particular when volume and weight play
a symmetrical role), any complete ranking of cargo types is necessarily arbitrary, and can
therefore lead to suboptimal decisions. Consequently, in our future research we aim to
develop booking policies with nested structures based on partial orderings of cargo types.
We note that our two-stage RLP model can accommodate randomness in the available
volume and weight capacities. Since there is often significant uncertainty in the capacity
utilized by allotment contracts, as well as in the capacity requirements of passenger bags,
extending our other methods to similarly allow random capacities is also an important
research goal. Finally, we mention that, as discussed in Section 4.1.3, our booking limits
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can be converted to limits on the expected volume and weight requirements of shipments.
Since such capacity limits appear to be more natural in a cargo context than limits on
the number of accepted requests, we plan to evaluate implementations of our booking
limits based on this approach. Furthermore, if the results from the evaluation justify this
capacity-based interpretation, we propose to directly develop separate booking limits in
terms of volume and weight.
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Appendix A
Mixture distributions
Here we provide an alternative analytical proof for Formula (3.3). A corresponding proof
for Formula (3.4) can be obtained analogously.
Lemma 6 Suppose that the random variable V has the following mixture cumulative
distribution function (CDF)
P(V ≤ v) =
m∑
i=1
piP(Vi ≤ v).
Then it follows for every n ∈ N that
m∑
i=1
B(pi,n)∑
j=1
Vij
d
=
n∑
j=1
V j , (A.1)
where the random variables V j are independent copies of the random variable V .
Proof. We prove the assertion by showing that the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of both
sides of the equation (A.1) are equal to each other. LetB = (B(p1, n), B(p2, n), ..., B(pm, n))
be a multinomially distributed random vector independent of the random variables Vij , i ∈
[m], j ∈ N. By the total law of expectation, the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of∑mi=1∑B(pi,n)j=1 Vij
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is obtained as follows:
E

exp(−s m∑
i=1
B(pi,n)∑
j=1
Vij)


=
∑
k∈K
E
[
exp(−s
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Vij)|B = (k1, k2, ..., km)
]
P (B = (k1, k2, ..., km))
=
∑
k∈K
n!∏m
i=1 ki!
m∏
i=1
pkii E
[
exp(−s
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Vij)
]
=
∑
k∈K
n!∏m
i=1 ki!
m∏
i=1
(piE[exp(−sVi)])
ki
=
(
m∑
i=1
piE[exp(−sVi)]
)n
, (A.2)
where K := {k ∈ Nm : k1 + · · ·+ km = n}.
Similarly, we also derive the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of ∑nj=1 V j:
E
[
exp(−s
n∑
j=1
V j)
]
=
(
E[exp(−sV )]
)n
=
(∫ ∞
0
exp(−sv)fV (v)dv
)n
=
(∫ ∞
0
exp(−sv)
m∑
i=0
pifVi(v)dv
)n
=
(
m∑
i=0
pi
∫ ∞
0
exp(−sv)fVi(v)dv
)n
=
(
m∑
i=1
piE[exp(−sVi)]
)n
. (A.3)
The assertion immediately follows from (A.2) and (A.3).
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Appendix B
Partial expectations
Partial expectation of the random variable X having probability density function f(.) is
defined as
E[X ]ba :=
∫ b
a
xf(x)dx.
Closed form of partial expectations is needed while calculating terms E[(X − y)+] or
similarly E[max(X, y)]. Therefore we will be using the equations below very frequently.
For some of the most popular choices for the volume distribution, we will illustrate these
calculations. (For more detailed study see Winkler et al. (1972))
Normal Distribution
Winkler et al. (1972) shows that, for X normally distributed with mean µ and variance
σ2, we have
E[X ]∞y = µ−
[
−σφ(
y − µ
σ
) + µΦ(
y − µ
σ
)
]
(B.1)
Log-normal Distribution
For X Log-normally distributed with parameters µ and σ2,
E[X ]∞y = exp
(
µ+
1
2
σ2
)
Φ
(
µ+ σ2 − ln y
σ
)
(B.2)
Mixtures
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For X having a mixture distribution, i.e. P(X ≤ x) =
∑m
i=1 piP(Xi ≤ x) where Xi
follows any of the distributions above, we have:
E[X ]∞y =
∫ ∞
y
xfX(x)dx =
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
y
xfXi(x)dx =
m∑
i=1
piE[Xi]
∞
y (B.3)
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Appendix C
Calculations required for the risk based model
As in most of the existing studies, we assume that off-loading cost functions hv and hw are
defined as in (3.1). In order to investigate whether it is possible to obtain a critical ratio
rule as in newsvendor models, we derive the expression for f(b+ 1)− f(b). Such a rule
has been developed for the passenger case in Aydin et al. (2010). For ease of exposition
let us introduce Svb :=
∑b
j=1 V j and Swb :=
∑b
j=1W j . Then, the following chain of
equalities holds:
f(b+ 1)− f(b) =
m∑
i=1
ρipi − E
[
θvV b+11{Sv
b
≥Cv} + θv(S
v
b+1 − Cv)1{Svb+1≥Cv and Svb≤Cv}
]
−E
[
θwW b+11{Sw
b
≥Cw} + θw(S
w
b+1 − Cw)1{Swb+1≥Cw and Swb ≤Cw}
]
=
m∑
i=1
ρipi − θvE
[
V b+1
]
P(Svb ≥ Cv)− θvE
[
(Svb+1 − Cv)1{Svb+1≥Cv and Svb≤Cv}
]
−θwE
[
W b+1
]
P(Swb ≥ Cw)− θwE
[
(Swb+1 − Cw)1{Swb+1≥Cw and Swb ≤Cw}
]
. (C.1)
The above difference function involves complicated expectations and convolution distri-
butions, it is really hard to obtain an analytical form for it. Thus, unlike the passenger case
this analysis does not lead to a critical ratio rule. Instead of calculating this difference, we
can calculate the function f(b) and search for the optimal total booking limit. However, it
is still computationally challenging to calculate the expected off-loading costs. One can
estimate these costs using approximation methods. For example, under the condition that
b would be large enough, Svb and Swb may be assumed to be normally distributed by the
Central Limit Theorem.
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For Svb :=
∑b
j=1 V j we have
E[Svb ] =E[
b∑
j=1
V j ] = bE[V ]
E[V ] =
∫ ∞
0
vfV (v)dv =
∫ ∞
0
v
m∑
i=1
pifVi(v)dv
=
m∑
i=1
pi
∫ ∞
0
vfVi(v)dv
=
m∑
i=1
piµ
v
i
∴ E[Svb ] = b
∑m
i=1 piµ
v
i
σ2(Svb ) =σ
2(
b∑
j=1
V j) = bσ
2(V )
σ2(V ) =
∫ ∞
0
(v − E[V ])2fV (v)dv
=
∫ ∞
0
v2fV (v)dv − 2E[V ]
∫ ∞
0
vfV (v)dv + E[V ]
2
=
m∑
i=1
piE[(Vi)
2]− E[V ]2
∴ σ2(Svb ) = b(
∑m
i=1 piE[(Vi)
2] − (
∑m
i=1 piµ
v
i )
2) Thus, under the normality assumption,
we have Svb ∼ Norm (E[Svb ], σ2(Svb )). This implies
Sv
b
−E[Sv
b
]
σ(Sv
b
)
= Y ∼ N(0, 1). Next, by
using (B.1) we calculate E[max{Svb − Cv, 0}].
E[max{Svb − Cv, 0}] =E [max (Y σ(S
v
b ) + E[S
v
b ]− Cv, 0)]
=σ(Svb )E
[
max
(
Y,
Cv − E[S
v
b ]
σ(Svb )
)]
+ E[Svb ]− Cv
=σ(Svb )
[
α(b)P (Y < α(b)) + E[Y ]∞α(b)
]
+ E[Svb ]− Cv
=σ(Svb ) [α(b)Φ (α(b)) + φ (α(b))] + E[S
v
b ]− Cv,
where α(b) = Cv−E[S
v
b
]
σ(Sv
b
)
, Φ(.) and φ(.) are the cumulative and probability density functions
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of the standard normal distribution. Then we have:
f(b) =
m∑
i=1
ρipib− θv (σ(S
v
b ) [α(b)Φ (α(b)) + φ (α(b))] + E[S
v
b ]− Cv)
−θw (σ(S
w
b ) [β(b)Φ (β(b)) + φ (β(b))] + E[S
w
b ]− Cw) ,
where β(b) = Cw−E[S
w
b
]
σ(Sw
b
)
.
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Appendix D
Expected revenue calculations
In this section, we show how to calculate E[ri(max{wi, Vi/γ})] when ri(.) is a piece-
wise linear function in chargeable weight (Wˆi) with three kinks. Let In be the range of
changeable weight where the slope of revenue function (αn) is equal to cn. Lower and
upper limits of range In are equal to bn−1 and bn respectively. (See Figure (D.1) for an
illustration.) We calculate the expected revenue in the following way:
Chargeable Weight
R
ev
en
ue
b0 b1 b2 b3
α1 = c1
α2 = c2
α3 = c3
α4 = c4
I4I2I1 I3
Figure D.1: An Illustrative Figure of Revenue Function
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ρi = E[ri(Wˆi)] = E[E[ri(Wˆi)|Wˆi ∈ In]] =
4∑
n=1
P(Wˆi ∈ In)E[ri(Wˆi)|Wˆi ∈ In]
=
4∑
n=1
P(Wˆi ∈ In)E[(Wˆi − bn−1)cn +
n−1∑
k=1
(bk − bk−1)ck]
=
4∑
n=1
P(Wˆi ∈ In)
[
cn
(
E[Wˆi]− bn−1
)
+
n−1∑
k=1
ck(bk − bk−1)
]
where
E[Wˆi] = E[max{Vi/γ, wi}] =
1
γ
E[max{Vi, wiγ}]
=
1
γ
(∫ wiγ
0
wiγf(x)dx+
∫ ∞
wiγ
xf(x)dx
)
=
1
γ
(
wiγFVi(wiγ) + E[Vi]
∞
wiγ
)
and
P(Wˆi ≤ x) = P(max(γwi, Vi) ≤ γx) = 1{x≥wi}P(max(γwi, Vi) ≤ γx)
= 1{x≥wi}[P(max(γwi, Vi) ≤ γx|Vi ≤ γwi ≤ γx)P(Vi ≤ γwi ≤ γx)
+P(max(γwi, Vi) ≤ γx|γwi ≤ Vi ≤ γx)P(γwi ≤ Vi ≤ γx)
+P(max(γwi, Vi) ≤ γx|γwi ≤ γx ≤ Vi)P(γwi ≤ γx ≤ Vi)]
= 1{x≥wi}[P(Vi ≤ γwi) + P(γwi ≤ Vi ≤ γx)] = 1{x≥wi}P(Vi ≤ γx).
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Appendix E
Fast Fourier Transform
The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) is defined by:
Xk =
N−1∑
n=0
xne
−i2πk n
N
Fast Fourier Transform is an algorithm to compute DFT or its inverse. In our case, we will
use it to obtain the inverse of DFT. In other words, we will compute the value of Xk and
obtain xn, n = 0, . . . , N − 1. We utilized FFT for calculating the probability distribution
of random variables Dj and
∑n
j=1Dk.
Recall that we consider a discrete-time framework, where the booking horizon is di-
vided in T time periods and T is sufficiently large so that there is at most one booking
request in each time period. The random demand for type-j cargo at time period t ∈ T ,
denoted by Djt, is a Bernoulli random variable with success probability of pjt. Then,
the total demand for type-j cargo is the sum of T independent Bernoulli random variables
with different success probabilities and it can take values of 0, 1, . . . , T . The characteristic
function of Dj is given by
ϕDj(z) = E[e
izDj ] =
T∑
n=0
eiznP (Dj = n). (E.1)
We can easily calculate this function using the characteristic functions of independent
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Bernoulli random variables:
ϕDj(z) = E[e
izDj ] =
T∏
t=1
E[eizDjt ] =
T∏
t=1
(eizpjt + 1− pjt). (E.2)
Basically, FFT method evaluates the characteristic function (E.2) at z = −2πk
T+1
for all
k = 0, 1, . . . , T and retrieves the probabilities P (Dj = n) using (E.1) and (E.2). In other
words, it solves the following set of equations to provide the probabilities P (Dj = n) as
output:
ϕDj(
−2πk
T + 1
) =
T∏
t=1
E[ei
−2pik
T+1
Djt ] =
T∑
n=0
P (Dj = n) exp(
−i2πkn
T + 1
), k = 0, . . . , T.
(E.3)
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Appendix F
Greedy Algorithm of Rinnooy Kan et al. (1993)
Let n denote the number of booking request arrivals, wj and vj be the observed volume
and weight of jth booking request arrival. Then xj and yj are defined as wj/Cw and vj/Cv
respectively, for all j ∈ [n].
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Obtaining Bid-Prices
1: Order the requests by increasing value of xj .
2: for j = 1 to n− 1 do
3: for l = j + 1 to n and yj ≥ yl do
4: Let γ := yl−yj
xl−xj
.
5: for h = 1 to n do
6: Let ηh := yh − γxh.
7: Order the requests by increasing value of ηh.
8: Start accepting requests in this order until no more requests can be accepted.
9: Let pi be the profit obtained and η be the order value for the last request that is ac-
cepted.
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: Find the maximum profit pi∗ over all orderings.
14: Let γ∗ and η∗ be the corresponding slope and order value.
15: return λw = −γ∗/η∗ and λv = 1/η∗.
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